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Abstract
This doctoral thesis contains three theoretical essays on the predictive power
of leading descriptive decision theories and one empirical essay on the impact
of stock market investors’ probability distortion on future economic growth.
Chapter 1 provides an extensive summary and motivation of all essays.
The first essay (Chapter 2, co-authored with Maik Dierkes) shows
that Cumulative Prospect Theory cannot explain both the St. Petersburg
paradox and the common ratio version of the Allais paradox simultaneously
if probability weighting and value functions are continuous. This result holds
independently of parametrizations of the value and probability weighting
function. Using both paradoxes as litmus tests, Cumulative Prospect Theory
with the majority of popular weighting functions loses its superior predictive
power over Expected Utility Theory. However, neo-additive weighting
functions (which are discontinuous) do solve the Allais - St. Petersburg
conflict.
The second essay in Chapter 3 (co-authored with Maik Dierkes) shows
that Salience Theory explains both a low willingness to pay, for example
$7.86 ($12.33), for playing the St. Petersburg lottery truncated at around
$1 million ($1 trillion) and reasonable preference reversal probabilities
around 0.33 in Allais’ common ratio paradox. Typical calibrations of
other prominent theories (for example, Cumulative Prospect Theory or
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Expected Utility Theory) cannot solve both paradoxes simultaneously. With
unbounded payoffs, however, Salience Theory’s ranking-based probability
distortion prevents such a solution - regardless of parametrizations. Fur-
thermore, the probability distortion in Salience Theory can be significantly
stronger than in Cumulative Prospect Theory, fully overriding the value
function’s risk attitude.
The third essay in Chapter 4 (co-authored with Maik Dierkes)
proves that subproportionality as a property of the probability weighting
function alone does not automatically imply the common ratio effect
in the framework of Cumulative Prospect Theory. Specifically, the issue
occurs in the case of equal-mean lotteries because both risk-averse and
risk-seeking behavior have to be predicted there. As a solution, we
propose three simple properties of the probability weighting function
which are sufficient to accommodate the empirical evidence of the
common ratio effect for equal-mean lotteries for any S-shaped value
function. These are (1) subproportionality, (2) indistinguishability of small
probabilities, and (3) an intersection point with the diagonal lower than
0.5. While subproportionality and a fixed point lower than 0.5 are common
assumptions in the literature, the property indistinguishability of small
probabilities is introduced for the first time. The ratio of decision weights
for infinitesimally small probabilities characterizes indistinguishability and
is also an informative measure for the curvature of the probability weighting
function at zero. The intuition behind indistinguishability is that, even
though the ratio of probabilities stays constant at a moderate level,
individuals tend to neglect this relative difference when probabilities get
smaller.
Finally, the fourth essay in Chapter 5 (co-authored with Maik Dierkes
and Stephan Germer) links stock market investors’ probability distortion
to future economic growth. The empirical challenge is to quantify the
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optimality of today’s decision making to test for its impact on future
economic growth. Fortunately, risk preferences can be estimated from stock
markets. Using monthly aggregate stock prices from 1926 to 2015, we esti-
mate risk preferences via an asset pricing model with Cumulative Prospect
Theory agents and distill a recently proposed probability distortion index.
This index negatively predicts GDP growth in-sample and out-of-sample.
Predictability is stronger and more reliable over longer horizons. Our results
suggest that distorted asset prices may lead to significant welfare losses.
Keywords: Cumulative Prospect Theory, Salience Theory, Allais - St. Pe-
tersburg Conflict, Common Ratio Effect, Probability Distortion, Economic
Growth
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Doktorarbeit enthält drei theoretische Abhandlungen über die Vorher-
sagekraft führender deskriptiver Entscheidungstheorien und eine empirische
Abhandlung über die Auswirkung der Wahrscheinlichkeitsverzerrung von
Aktienmarktinvestoren auf das zukünftige Wirtschaftswachstum. Kapitel 1
bietet eine ausführliche Zusammenfassung und Motivation aller Aufsätze.
Der erste Aufsatz (Kapitel 2, gemeinsam mit Maik Dierkes verfasst)
zeigt, dass die kumulative Prospect-Theorie das St. Petersburg-Paradoxon
und die Common-Ratio-Version des Allais-Paradoxons nicht gleichzeitig
erklären kann, wenn Wahrscheinlichkeitsgewichtungs- und Wertfunktion
stetig sind. Dieses Ergebnis gilt unabhängig von den Parametrisierungen der
Wert- und Wahrscheinlichkeitsgewichtungsfunktion. Wenn beide Paradoxe
als Lackmustest verwendet werden, verliert die kumulative Prospect-Theorie
mit den meisten gängigen Gewichtungsfunktionen ihre überlegene Vorher-
sagekraft gegenüber der Erwartungsnutzentheorie. Neoadditive Gewich-
tungsfunktionen (die unstetig an den Stellen 0 und 1 sind) lösen jedoch den
Konflikt zwischen dem Allais-Paradoxon und St. Petersburg-Paradoxon.
Der zweite Aufsatz in Kapitel 3 (gemeinsam mit Maik Dierkes verfasst)
zeigt, dass die Salience-Theorie sowohl eine geringe Zahlungsbereitschaft
von beispielsweise 7,86 USD (12,33 USD) für das Spielen der auf rund
1 Million USD (1 Billion USD) gekürzten St. Petersburg-Lotterie als
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auch angemessene Präferenzumkehrwahrscheinlichkeiten um Wahrschein-
lichkeiten von 0,33 in Allais’ Common-Ratio-Paradoxon erklärt. Typische
Kalibrierungen anderer bekannter Theorien (z. B. kumulative Prospect-
Theorie oder Erwartungsnutzentheorie) können nicht beide Paradoxien
gleichzeitig lösen. Bei unbegrenzten Auszahlungen verhindert jedoch die
auf der Rangfolge basierende Wahrscheinlichkeitsverzerrung der Salience-
Theorie eine solche Lösung - unabhängig von den Parametrisierungen.
Darüber hinaus kann die Wahrscheinlichkeitsverzerrung der Salience-
Theorie erheblich stärker sein als in der kumulativen Prospect-Theorie,
wodurch die Risikoeinstellung der Wertfunktion vollständig außer Kraft
gesetzt werden kann.
Der dritte Aufsatz in Kapitel 4 (gemeinsam mit Maik Dierkes verfasst)
belegt, dass im Rahmen der kumulativen Prospect-Theorie die Subpro-
portionalität als Eigenschaft der Wahrscheinlichkeitsgewichtungsfunktion
allein nicht automatisch den Common-Ratio-Effekt impliziert. Insbesondere
tritt das Problem bei Lotterien mit gleichem Erwartungswert auf, da
dort sowohl risikoaverses als auch risikofreudiges Verhalten vorhergesagt
werden muss. Als Lösung schlagen wir drei einfache Eigenschaften der
Wahrscheinlichkeitsgewichtungsfunktion vor, die ausreichen, um den em-
pirischen Nachweis des Common-Ratio-Effekts für Lotterien mit gleichem
Mittelwert für jede S-förmige Wertefunktion aufzunehmen. Diese sind
(1) Subproportionalität, (2) Ununterscheidbarkeit kleiner Wahrschein-
lichkeiten und (3) ein Schnittpunkt mit der Diagonalen unterhalb von 0,5.
Während in der Literatur Subproportionalität und ein Fixpunkt unter
0,5 gängige Annahmen sind, wird erstmals die Eigenschaft "Unun-
terscheidbarkeit kleiner Wahrscheinlichkeiten" eingeführt. Das Verhält-
nis der Entscheidungsgewichte für unendlich kleine Wahrscheinlichkeiten
kennzeichnet die Ununterscheidbarkeit und ist auch ein aussagekräftiges
Maß für die Krümmung der Wahrscheinlichkeitsgewichtungsfunktion bei
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Null. Die Intuition hinter der Ununterscheidbarkeit ist, dass Individuen
den relativen Unterschied zwischen Wahrscheinlichkeiten vernachlässigen,
wenn die Wahrscheinlichkeiten kleiner werden, obwohl das Verhältnis der
Wahrscheinlichkeiten auf einem moderaten Niveau konstant bleibt.
Abschließend verknüpft der vierte Aufsatz in Kapitel 5 (gemeinsam mit
Maik Dierkes und Stephan Germer verfasst) die Wahrscheinlichkeitsverzer-
rung von Aktienmarktinvestoren mit dem zukünftigen Wirtschaftswachs-
tum. Die empirische Herausforderung besteht hierbei, die Optimalität der
heutigen Entscheidungsfindung zu quantifizieren, um ihre Auswirkungen
auf das zukünftige Wirtschaftswachstum zu testen. Glücklicherweise können
Risikopräferenzen von den Aktienmärkten geschätzt werden. Unter Verwen-
dung der monatlichen aggregierten Aktienkurse von 1926 bis 2015 schätzen
wir die Risikopräferenzen über ein Asset-Pricing-Modell mit kumulativen
Prospect-Theorie-Agenten und destillieren einen kürzlich vorgeschlagenen
Wahrscheinlichkeitsverzerrungsindex. Dieser Index prognostiziert ein neg-
atives GDP-Wachstum innerhalb und außerhalb der Stichprobe. Dabei
ist die Vorhersagbarkeit über längere Zeiträume hinweg stärker und
zuverlässiger. Unsere Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass verzerrte Vermögenspreise
zu erheblichen Wohlfahrtsverlusten führen können.
Schlagwörter: Kumulative Prospect-Theorie, Salience-Theorie, Allais -
St. Petersburg-Konflikt, Common-Ratio-Effekt, Wahrscheinlichkeitsverzer-
rung, Wirtschaftswachstum
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Expected Utility Theory has been the leading theory of choice under risk and
the core of rational decision making for nearly three centuries. The idea of
Expected Utility Theory goes back to Bernoulli (1738, 1954) who proposed
a concave utility transformation of final wealth to solve the St. Petersburg
paradox which describes the fact that hardly anyone would be willing to
pay an infinite amount of money for a lottery with infinite expected value
which promises an amount of $2k with probability 2−k for k ∈ N>0. This
fact was used as evidence against Expected Value Theory and was a key
motivation to include risk aversion in normative decision theory to restore
a minimum level of descriptive power. Roughly two centuries after Daniel
Bernoulli’s publication, von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) provided an
axiomatic foundation of Expected Utility Theory.1
Nowadays, Expected Utility Theory is still widely accepted and
applied as a normative model of rational behavior but hardly as a
1Besides the significant contributions of Bernoulli (1738, 1954) and von Neumann
& Morgenstern (1944), the works of Ramsey (1931) and Savage (1954) were also of
great importance for the further development and understanding of Expected Utility
Theory and should therefore not remain unmentioned. For a detailed historical review,
see Fishburn (1988).
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descriptive model. Over the last seven decades, the literature that questions
Expected Utility Theory’s descriptive power is consistently growing. One
of the first studies that revealed persistent and systematic violations of
Expected Utility Theory was Allais (1953) with his prominent Allais
paradox. He showed that individuals’ choice behavior violates Expected
Utility Theory’s independence axiom. In particular, he observed that
individuals seem to process probabilities of risky outcomes in a non-linear
way. A simple demonstration of the Allais paradox is the common ratio
effect which involves choices between the two-outcome lotteries L1(p) =
($6000, 0.5p; $0, 1− 0.5p) and L2(p) = ($3000, p; $0, 1− p) where p is a
probability. Empirically, subjects choose the safer lottery L2 for high
probabilities p and the riskier lottery L1 for low probabilities p (see, e.g.,
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The independence axiom, however, does not
allow for this change in preference over L1 and L2 for varying p ∈ (0, 1].
This observation initiated the development of behavioral decision
theories such as Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) prominent Prospect
Theory. The advanced version, Cumulative Prospect Theory by Tversky
& Kahneman (1992), is largely considered to be the most powerful model
to describe individual decision making under risk. It captures experimental
evidence such as reference dependence, diminishing value sensitivity, loss
aversion and probability weighting (see Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1992).
The first essay of this thesis (Chapter 2, co-authored with Maik
Dierkes) tests whether Cumulative Prospect Theory is able to accommodate
both Bernoulli’s (1738, 1954) St. Petersburg paradox and Allais’ (1953)
common ratio paradox with one set of parameters. The main result of this
paper is that only discontinuous probability weighting functions – such as
neoadditive weighting functions (Wakker, 2010) – can solve both paradoxes
simultaneously. This result holds independently of parametrizations of the
2
value and probability weighting function. If value and probability weighting
functions are continuous, as it is usually assumed in the literature, then
Cumulative Prospect Theory cannot explain both the choice behavior in
the Allais paradox and the finite willingness to pay to participate in
the St. Petersburg lottery at the same time. For example, consider the
originally proposed parametrization in Tversky & Kahneman (1992) where
the probability weighting function is given by w(p) = pγ/ (pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ
with γ > 0 and the value function over gains is given by v(x) = xα with
α > 0. Finite willingness to pay for the St. Petersburg lottery requires
the parameter restriction α < γ while predicting Allais’ common ratio
effect requires the opposite inequality α ≥ γ. The particular strength
of this paper stems from the fact that we generalize this result to all
continuous and strictly increasing value functions v and all continuous and
strictly increasing probability weighting functions w with w(0) = 0 and
w(1) = 1. Put differently, this joint test dismisses large classes of popular
probability weighting functions (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Prelec,
1998; Goldstein & Einhorn, 1987; Rieger & Wang, 2006) and considerably
reduces the set of potentially promising weighting functions. Hence, future
research shall rather embrace discontinuous weighting functions, such as
neo-additive weighting functions (Wakker, 2010) and their obvious nonlinear
extensions.
We motivate our test procedure with the fact that virtually all theories
of decision making under risk are motivated by either the St. Petersburg
paradox or the Allais paradox, but a discrepancy between these two
paradoxes has, to the best of our knowledge, never been addressed before.
We therefore propose the joint consideration of both paradoxes as the new
minimum standard to test descriptive decision theories.
The second essay in Chapter 3 (co-authored with Maik Dierkes) tests
whether Bordalo et al.’s (2012) Salience Theory is able to resolve the
3
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Allais - St. Petersburg conflict documented in the previous chapter. Salience
Theory is a relatively new promising context-dependent descriptive theory of
choice under risk which models a Local Thinker who re-weights probabilities
in favor of salient payoffs. Bordalo et al. (2012, p. 1243) argue that Salience
Theory “provides a novel and unified account of many empirical phenomena,
including frequent risk-seeking behavior, invariance failures such as the
Allais paradox, and preference reversals.” Their analysis, however, does not
include the St. Petersburg paradox. Our paper complements the relatively
new strand of literature which tests Salience Theory empirically and
theoretically.2 In particular, we are, to the best of our knowledge, the first
to investigate the St. Petersburg paradox under Salience Theory.
Our main result is that Salience Theory can resolve the Allais -
St. Petersburg conflict but only under the assumptions of finite resources
and a value function which generates substantial risk aversion (such as
bounded value functions). A simple parametrization of Salience Theory
that performs sufficiently well consists of the exponential value function
v(x) = 1 − e−x, a probability-distortion parameter value δ ≈ 0.4, and
any salience function for ranking states with the properties ordering
and diminishing sensitivity, as proposed by Bordalo et al. (2012). This
simple parametrization simultaneously predicts a reasonable willingness
to pay of $7.86 ($12.33) for the St. Petersburg lottery truncated at
the maximum payoff of $220 ≈ 1 million ($240 ≈ 1 trillion) dollars
and an empirically substantiated preference reversal probability p∗ ≈ 1
3
for the common ratio lotteries L1 and L2. For this specification, the
Allais - St. Petersburg conflict emerges only asymptotically, i.e. when
considering the original St. Petersburg lottery with infinite expected payoff.
In a realistic, resource-constrained environment, this Salience Theory
2See, for example, Kontek (2016); Frydman & Mormann (2018); Nielsen et al. (2018);
Königsheim et al. (2019)
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specification has an edge over Expected Utility Theory and most Cumulative
Prospect Theory calibrations. Recall that, for Cumulative Prospect Theory
with continuous preference functions, any solution to Allais’ common ratio
effect predicts – at odds with experimental evidence – huge willingness to
pay for the St. Petersburg lottery, easily exceeding the expected payoff of
the truncated St. Petersburg lottery.
Furthermore, we show that the probability distortion in Salience
Theory can be significantly stronger than in Cumulative Prospect Theory.
An interesting implication of the latter finding is that the use of bounded
value functions does not necessarily solve the St. Petersburg paradox under
Salience Theory. Note that, under Cumulative Prospect Theory or Expected
Utility Theory, bounded value functions always solve the St. Petersburg
paradox (e.g. Dierkes & Sejdiu, 2019b; Rieger & Wang, 2006).
The third essay in Chapter 4 (co-authored with Maik Dierkes) clarifies
frequent misunderstandings about the relationship of subproportionality as
a property of the probability weighting function and the common ratio
effect. As selected quotes in Table A.1 in Dierkes & Sejdiu (2019a) show,
many researchers equate subproportionality to Allais’ common ratio effect.
Our paper, however, points out that this is not always the case.
Kahneman & Tversky (1979, p. 282) call a probability weighting
function w subproportional “if and only if logw(p) is a convex function of
log p”. Note that this definition allows probability weighting functions to be
inverse S-shaped or convex (Fehr-Duda & Epper, 2012). Convex probability
weighting functions, however, do not overweight small probabilities and,
therefore, are not able to override the risk attitude predetermined by
a S-shaped value function. Being able to predict both risk-averse and
risk-seeking behavior is, however, imperative when it comes to the prediction
of the common ratio effect for choices between equal-mean lotteries.
As a solution, we propose three simple properties of the probability
5
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weighting function (including subproportionality) which are sufficient to
explain the common ratio effect for equal-mean lotteries for any S-shaped
value function (i.e. concave over gains and convex over losses). For given
lotteries Lr(p) = ($z,∆p ; $0, 1−∆p) and Ls(p) = ($∆z, p ; $0, 1− p)
with payoff z > 0, common ratio ∆ ∈ (0, 1), and varying probability p ∈
(0, 1], the three conditions on w are:
(1) Subproportionality: w(∆p)/w(p) > w(∆q)/w(q), ∀ 0 < p < q ≤ 1,
(2) Indistinguishability of small probabilities: limp→0+ w(∆p)/w(p) = 1,
(3) Inner fixed point restriction: w(∆) ≤ ∆.
While properties (1) and (3) are common assumptions in the literature,
the second property which we call indistinguishability of small probabilities
(abbreviated indistinguishability) is introduced for the first time. This
property is key to ensure that for any S-shaped value function, a risk-seeking
behavior for choices between two simple equal-mean lotteries can always be
predicted by just decreasing the probabilities of winning towards zero by
equal proportion. The intuition behind this property is that, even though
the ratio of probabilities stays constant at a moderate level, individuals tend
to neglect this relative difference when probabilities get smaller and focus
solely on the outcomes.
The ratio of decision weights for infinitesimally small probabilities
(limp→0+ w(∆p)/w(p)), which characterizes indistinguishability, is also an
informative measure for the probabilistic risk attitude of individuals.
In particular, it can be used to classify probability weighting functions
according to their processing of small probabilities. Specifically, we show
that limp→0+ w(∆p)/w(p) is directly linked to a probabilistic counterpart
of the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion at probability p = 0.
While Prelec (1998) considers the absolute Arrow-Pratt measure and relates
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the relative version in log-log scales to subproportionality, we prove for the
first time that the relative Arrow-Pratt measure at p = 0 is closely related
to indistinguishability of small probabilities.
The last essay in Chapter 5 (co-authored with Maik Dierkes and
Stephan Germer) studies the impact of probability distortion on future
economic growth. A cornerstone concept of modern economics is that
prices for goods are set to match demand and supply. The good’s price
ensures an efficient allocation such that it is used for projects with superior
profitability. But what if prices are wrong? What if demand is determined by
irrational preferences and, hence, prices reflect this irrationality? According
to the logic above, such irrationality poses a threat to economic welfare.
Irrationality would lead to lower GDP growth due to the inefficient
allocation of resources. As Lamont & Thaler (2003, pp. 227-228) put it:
“Do asset markets offer rational signals to the economy about
where to invest real resources? If some firms have stock prices
that are far from intrinsic value, then those firms will attract
too much or too little capital.”
In this paper, we infer potentially irrational preferences from stock
prices and find that lower future GDP growth is linked to a higher degree
of irrationality. We use the term "rational" to refer to preferences which
are consistent with Expected Utility Theory and "irrational" in case they
conflict. Our interest centers on violations of Expected Utility Theory’s
independence axiom because this axiom is key to rational behavior. In
Cumulative Prospect Theory, the independence axiom is relaxed by the
non-linear processing of probabilities. To infer a probability distortion
index, we employ the equilibrium asset pricing model of Barberis & Huang
(2008) which assumes that prices on financial market are set by investors
who behave according to Cumulative Prospect Theory. Our estimation
7
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of potential irrationality is possible because stock prices reflect aggregate
preferences of an economy.
Our key finding is that stronger probability distortion today reliably
predicts lower future GDP growth in-sample and out-of-sample. This
negative link is stronger and statistically more reliable over longer
prediction horizons. Our results are robust to numerous variations, such as
different calibration procedures of the asset pricing model (simple average
returns vs. moving average estimators; GARCH vs. EGARCH), different
measures for probability distortion (likelihood insensitivity and Prelec’s
(1998) probability weighting function), and sample splits (1953-1984 and
1985-2015). Our conjecture is that suboptimal decision making is one
channel by which today’s market prices and future GDP growth are linked.
Implicitly, we provide evidence that stock prices can deviate from their
rationally warranted fundamental value.
All chapters of this thesis are self-contained. Therefore, in each chapter,
variables and acronyms are redefined. Of course, the notation was adapted
whenever possible to promote readability.
8

Chapter 2
The Need for Discontinuous
Probability Weighting
Functions: How Cumulative
Prospect Theory is torn
between the Allais Paradox and
the St. Petersburg Paradox∗
2.1 Introduction
Descriptive theories of decision making under risk are typically required
to pass one or more litmus tests. Such tests help to determine whether a
∗This chapter is based on the Working Paper “The Need for Discontinuous Probability
Weighting Functions: How Cumulative Prospect Theory is torn between the Allais
Paradox and the St. Petersburg Paradox” authored by Maik Dierkes and Vulnet Sejdiu,
2019. We are particularly grateful to Johannes Jaspersen and Walther Paravicini for
comments and very helpful advice.
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theory of decision making is able to predict human behavior to a desired
extent. The most prominent tests in decision theory include Bernoulli’s
(1738, 1954) St. Petersburg paradox and the Allais paradox (Allais,
1953). Both paradoxes have paved the way for new decision theories
and helped define the prevailing standard of a certain era. Specifically,
the St. Petersburg paradox criticized Expected Value Theory (EVT) and
fostered the dominance of Expected Utility Theory (EUT) thereafter.
Similarly, the Allais paradox revealed inconsistencies of EUT with actually
observed choice behavior and, thus, initiated the development of descriptive
decision theories such as Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) prominent Prospect
Theory. The advanced version, Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) by
Tversky & Kahneman (1992) which is based on Rank Dependent Utility
Theory (RDU; Quiggin, 1982), is largely considered to be the most powerful
model to describe individual decision making under risk and uncertainty.
Virtually all theories of decision making under risk are motivated by
either the St. Petersburg paradox or the Allais paradox, but a potential
discrepancy between these two paradoxes has, to the best of our knowledge,
never been addressed before. We propose the joint consideration of both
paradoxes as the new minimum standard to test descriptive decision
theories.
In this paper, we show that CPT is torn between both paradoxes in
the following way. If value and weighting functions are continuous, CPT
cannot explain both the choice behavior in the Allais paradox and the
finite willingness to pay to participate in the St. Petersburg lottery at the
same time. For example, consider the originally proposed parametrization
in Tversky & Kahneman (1992) where the probability weighting function is
given by w(p) = pγ/ (pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ with γ > 0 and the value function
over gains is given by v(x) = xα with α > 0. Finite willingness to pay
for the St. Petersburg lottery requires the parameter restriction α < γ
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while predicting Allais’ common ratio effect requires the opposite inequality
α ≥ γ. The more interesting novelty of this paper stems from the fact
that we generalize this result to all continuous and strictly increasing value
functions v and all continuous and strictly increasing probability weighting
functions w with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1. Put differently, this joint
test dismisses large classes of popular probability weighting functions and
considerably reduces the set of potentially promising weighting functions.
If the probability weighting function is discontinuous, however, a
solution to both paradoxes is possible. Neo-additive weighting functions,
as formalized by Wakker (2010) via w(0) = 0, w(1) = 1, and w(p) = a+ bp
for p ∈ (0, 1) with a, b > 0, a + b ≤ 1, presumably constitute the
simplest class of such weighting functions. Kilka & Weber (2001, p. 1717)
use it for approximating continuous weighting functions while Baillon
et al. (2018) regard it as a full-fledged alternative to popular continuous
weighting functions. Neo-additive weighting functions are popular for
decision making under ambiguity (e.g. Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Baillon
et al., 2017; Chateauneuf et al., 2007). To account for more complex
choice behavior for moderate probabilities (Harless & Camerer, 1994;
Wu & Gonzalez, 1996) neo-additive weighting functions might be too
restrictive and should be amended by some non-linearities. Discontinuities
are, however, indispensable to accommodate both Allais’ common ratio
effect and the St. Petersburg paradox.
In light of these results, we find it stunning how much more predictive
power Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) originally proposed discontinuous
probability weighting function has (when applied in a rank-dependent
framework, of course) compared to Tversky & Kahneman’s (1992) con-
tinuous weighting function. In the original paper, Figure 4 depicts a
hypothesized, yet discontinuous weighting function which “is relatively
shallow in the open interval and changes abruptly near the end-points where
12
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w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1” and which “is not well-behaved near the end-points”
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 282f.).
Our theoretical findings are consistent with and, in fact, strongly
support the empirical estimates in Barseghyan et al. (2013). Based on
more than 4000 households’ insurance deductible choices, they fit a
quadratic polynomial on the probability interval [0, 0.16] and estimate the
intercept at 0.061, indicating a discontinuity at probability zero. Thus,
our theoretical results virtually echo their estimate which they find “is
striking in its resemblance to the probability weighting function originally
posited by Kahneman & Tversky (1979). In particular, it is consistent
with a probability weighting function that exhibits overweighting of small
probabilities, exhibits mild insensitivity to changes in probabilities, and
trends toward a positive intercept as [the probability] approaches zero [. . .].
By contrast, the probability weighting functions later suggested by Tversky
& Kahneman (1992), Lattimore, Baker, & Witte (1992), and Prelec (1998)
– which are commonly used in the literature [. . .] – will not fit our data well,
because they trend toward a zero intercept [. . .]” (Barseghyan et al., 2013,
p. 2515).
To provide some intuition for our results, recall that the St. Petersburg
paradox describes the fact that hardly anyone would be willing to pay an
infinite amount of money for the lottery with infinite expected value which
promises an amount of $2k with probability 2−k for k = 1, 2, 3 . . . . This fact
was used as evidence against EVT and was a key motivation to include risk
aversion in normative decision theory – such as EUT – to restore a minimum
level of descriptive power. It dates back to 1713 and is among the oldest
and most prominent litmus tests for models of risky decision making. Based
on the ratio test, we then show that, under CPT, a necessary condition for
13
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finite willingness to pay is
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)− w(0.25p)
w(p)− w(0.5p) ≤ limz→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
. (STP )
For continuous (and strictly increasing) probability weighting functions w,
this necessary condition is equivalent to the following simpler necessary
condition which is useful when analyzing the common ratio effect:
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
≤ lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
(STP ∗)
Now consider the Allais paradox. The Allais paradox exists in different
versions and uncovers a violation of EUT’s independence axiom. We
focus on the common ratio version which involves choices between equal
mean lotteries such as L1(p) = ($z, 0.5p; $0, 1− 0.5p) and L2(p) =
($z/2, p; $0, 1− p) where p is a probability. Kahneman & Tversky (1979)
use payoff z = 6000 and p ∈ {0.002, 0.9} in Problems 7 and 8. Empirically,
subjects choose the safer lottery L2 for high probabilities p and the riskier
lottery L1 for low probabilities p. EUT’s independence axiom, however,
does not allow for this change in preference over L1 and L2 for varying
probabilities p. In our analysis, we make explicit use of Allais’ (1953) notion
that the common ratio effect emerges in particular for large payoffs z in
lotteries L1 and L2. He used payoffs in the millions. We then derive the
following necessary condition for the common ratio effect:
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
≥ lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
. (CRE∗)
When comparing conditions (CRE∗) and (STP ∗), both inequalities turn
into a single equality and we also rule out this equality as a potentially
remaining case. Put differently, with continuous (and strictly increasing) v
and w there does not exist a simultaneous solution to both paradoxes –
independent of the exact parametrizations. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to prove this general result.
14
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Furthermore, in the CPT framework, any simultaneous solution
to both paradoxes must drive a wedge between lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)−w(0.25p)
w(p)−w(0.5p) and
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
and thus involves discontinuous probability weighting functions.
Neo-additive weighting functions wneo (see Wakker, 2010) are presumably
the simplest class of such weighting functions. For those functions it holds
lim
p→0+
wneo(0.5p)−wneo(0.25p)
wneo(p)−wneo(0.5p) = 0.5 and limp→0+
wneo(0.5p)
wneo(p)
= 1. Specifically, if we
choose, for example, a = 0.1, b = 0.8, and v(x) = x0.7, the CPT decision
maker is willing to pay $5.89 to be entitled to the St. Petersburg lottery
and exhibits the typical choice pattern between the common ratio lotteries
L1 and L2 with preference reversal probability p∗ = 0.42.
Using large payoffs, z → ∞, in the Allais paradox above might
appear extreme at first glance, but is supported by experimental evidence.
If CPT’s value function is parameterized by the power value function
v(x) = xα, as is most often the case in empirical calibration studies,
then the v-ratio v(0.5z)
v(z)
is independent of payoff z and using large payoffs
is irrelevant. In other words, the power value function inhibits a solution
to both paradoxes if the weighting function is continuous. With other value
functions and continuous weighting functions, solutions might theoretically
exist for moderate payoffs only - at odds with Camerer (1989), Conlisk
(1989), Fan (2002), Huck & Müller (2012), and Agranov & Ortoleva
(2017) who report less frequent Allais-type violations of EUT for small
payoffs. A sensitivity analysis, however, explicitly rejects other typical
value functions (exponential, logarithmic, and HARA) because of their
unrealistic predictions. For example, De Giorgi & Hens (2006) motivate
an exponential value function, i.e. v(x) = β (1− e−αx) with absolute risk
aversion coefficient α ≈ 0.2 and β > 0. This bounded value function always
ensures finite willingness to pay in the St. Petersburg paradox. Presumably,
optimal conditions for the emergence of the common ratio effect are then a
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low preference reversal probability p∗ and Prelec’s (1998) subproportional
weighting function with low curvature parameter γ. If we conservatively
set γ = 0.53 from Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000) and fix p∗ = 0.002 (which
Problem 8 in Kahneman & Tversky (1979) indicates as an extreme lower
boundary for p∗) then a preference switch from safe lottery L2 to risky
lottery L1 happens for payoffs z < $18.08 only – undoubtedly an unrealistic
prediction. The appendix provides the details.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to show that solving
the St. Petersburg paradox rules out practically all CPT preferences that
explain the common ratio version of the Allais paradox as long as preferences
are given by the same continuous value and weighting function across both
paradoxes. Some authors analyze the restrictions that finite willingness to
pay for the St. Petersburg lottery places on CPT (e.g. Blavatskyy, 2005;
Camerer, 2005; Rieger & Wang, 2006; De Giorgi & Hens, 2006; Cox &
Sadiraj, 2008; Pfiffelmann, 2011), but the conflict with the common ratio
effect, independent of parametrizations, has not been discovered before.
Our results are not fabricated by the infinite expected payoff of the
original St. Petersburg lottery and we refer to the original St. Petersburg
gamble because of its prominence. An analysis of truncated St. Petersburg
lotteries does not change our conclusions. For example, assume the lottery’s
maximum payoff is truncated at $230 which equals roughly 1 billion
dollars and corresponds to 29 possible rounds of coin flipping. The usual
parametrization in Tversky & Kahneman (1992) with α = 0.88 and γ = 0.61
which predicts the common ratio effect implies that the CPT decision maker
would pay up to $2, 899.88 to play this lottery – about 93 times more
than the expected payoff of $31. Such price predictions are absurd and
inconsistent with the empirical evidence (e.g. Hayden & Platt, 2009; Cox
et al., 2011). Further, Rieger & Wang’s (2006) arguments show that CPT
can predict infinite willingness to pay (certainty equivalent) even in cases
16
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of risks with finite expected value.
We further clarify that the slope of continuous probability weighting
functions at probability zero is less important for the St. Petersburg paradox
than often thought. Rather the trade-off between the limits of the w-ratio
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
and v-ratio lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
is key. For smooth weighting functions, the
w-ratio limit is equivalent to a probabilistic counterpart of the Arrow-Pratt
measure of relative risk aversion, lim
p→0+
pw
′′(p)
w′(p) (see Dierkes & Sejdiu, 2019a).
In particular, the limit of the w-ratio reflects the risk attitude induced by the
probability weighting function better than the slope at probability zero. For
example, the inverse S-shaped versions of the Tversky & Kahneman (1992)
and Prelec (1998) weighting functions have w-ratio limits of 0.5γ ∈ (0, 1) and
1, respectively, while both have infinite slope (first derivative) and curvature
(second derivative) at zero and, thus, appear indistinguishable on these
latter metrics. It is noteworthy that a strictly concave value function v over
gains and a positive, but finite slope w′(0) cannot explain the common ratio
effect (provided w is smooth, of course) because then lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= 0.5 and
0.5 < v(0.5z)
v(z)
< 1 for fixed z > 0, and the necessary condition is violated.
Put differently, scaling down probabilities in the common ratio lotteries
counterfactually leads to a risk-averse choice if the continuous probability
weighting function has a finite slope at zero and the value function is strictly
concave.
The probabilistic and classical Arrow-Pratt measures of relative risk
aversion allow for an intuitive interpretation in, for example, Tversky &
Kahneman’s (1992) original parametrization. The sum of probabilistic risk
aversion at probability p → 0+ and the value function’s risk aversion has
to be strictly positive for finite willingness to pay in the St. Petersburg
paradox, while the common ratio effect emerges only for negative overall
risk aversion (risk proclivity).
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Finally, the discrepancy between both the St. Petersburg and the Allais
paradox is not an artifact of the preference reversal phenomenon whereby
there can occur inconsistencies between choice and valuation tasks (see,
e.g., Lichtenstein & Slovic (1971) for an early reference).1 In fact, the
preference reversal phenomenon makes CPT’s difficulties to predict both
paradoxes even greater. According to Tversky et al. (1990), there is more
overweighting of small probabilities for high payoffs in pricing tasks, such
as in the St. Petersburg paradox, than in choice tasks, such as in the Allais
paradox. So, let us assume we elicited an individual’s preference parameter
combination (α, γ) by a clever sequence of Allais type choices. In particular,
we would typically get α > γ. Then, Tversky et al. (1990) suggest to lower γ
to predict the individual’s willingness to pay in the St. Petersburg game. An
even lower γ, however, would counterfactually predict an infinite certainty
equivalent for the St. Petersburg lottery. Moreover, the preference reversal
phenomenon typically occurs when individuals deal with specific types of
lotteries – the so-called P -bet and $-bet. And the characteristics of these
bets do not match those in the two paradoxes.
Next to discontinuous probability weighting functions, another poten-
tial explanation for both paradoxes within the CPT framework might be
varying preferences across both paradoxes. It is well known that CPT
preferences can be driven by, for example, affect (Rottenstreich & Hsee,
2001), feelings (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004), or perceived self-competence
(Kilka & Weber, 2001). Similarly, Harrison & Rutström (2009) deliberately
model decision makers with a latent process which switches between
evaluation according to EUT or CPT. Whether differences in the Allais
paradox and St. Petersburg paradox trigger such changes in preferences is
an open question, though.
1Schmidt et al.’s (2008) third generation Prospect Theory enhances CPT to allow,
for example, for such preference reversals.
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The remainder of this paper illustrates our conclusions by formal proofs
and numerical examples.
2.2 The Allais - St. Petersburg Conflict
We make the following assumptions throughout our discussion:
Assumption 2.1 (Preference Calculus)
a) The decision maker’s utility for a lottery (x1, p1;x2, p2; . . .) is given by
Cumulative Prospect Theory. That is the decision maker has a value
function v and a probability weighting function w. Assuming without
loss of generality that payoffs are rank ordered such that 0 ≤ x1 ≤
x2 ≤ . . ., the CPT value is given by v(x1)[w(p1 + p2 + . . .) − w(p2 +
p3 + . . .)] + v(x2)[w(p2 + p3 + . . .)− w(p3 + p4 + . . .)] + . . ..
b) The value function v is continuous and strictly monotonically increas-
ing with v(0) = 0.
c) The probability weighting function w is continuous and strictly
monotonically increasing with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1.
d) The reference point is the current wealth level. In particular, all lottery
payoffs considered here are perceived as gains.2
Assumption 2.2 (Mathematical Notation) Whenever we use limits,
e.g. limx→z f(x), we implicitly assume these limits exist in a weak sense,
i.e. limes superior and limes inferior coincide and limx→z f(x) ∈ [−∞,∞].
2Without loss of generality, we follow the typical assumption that the reference points
is fixed at zero in both paradoxes. In particular, theories with stochastic reference points
(Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006) are not applicable.
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2.2.1 The St. Petersburg Paradox under CPT
Bernoulli’s (1738, 1954) St. Petersburg lottery LSTP promises an amount of
$2k with probability 2−k for k ∈ N>0. Although the expected value of LSTP
is infinite, real decision makers are only willing to pay a low price for lottery
LSTP .3 Under CPT, the decision maker assigns the following utility to the
St. Petersburg lottery LSTP :
CPT (LSTP ) =
∞∑
k=1
v
(
2k
) · [w( ∞∑
i=k
1
2i
)
− w
( ∞∑
i=k+1
1
2i
)]
=
∞∑
k=1
v
(
2k
) · [w (21−k)− w (2−k)] . (2.1)
A CPT decision maker’s willingness to pay for the lottery LSTP is given
by the certainty equivalent v−1(CPT (LSTP )). The following theorem states
conditions for a finite certainty equivalent under CPT.
Theorem 2.1 (Emergence of the St. Petersburg paradox)
Let v : R → R be a strictly increasing value function and w : [0, 1] → [0, 1]
be a strictly increasing probability weighting function with w(0) = 0 and
w(1) = 1. Then, it holds for the St. Petersburg lottery LSTP :
a) A CPT decision maker reports finite willingness to pay for LSTP if v
is bounded from above.
b) Assume v is unbounded. Then, a CPT decision maker reports finite
willingness to pay for LSTP if (sufficient condition)
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)− w(0.25p)
w(p)− w(0.5p) < limz→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
. (2.2)
c) A necessary condition for finite willingness to pay for LSTP is
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)− w(0.25p)
w(p)− w(0.5p) ≤ limz→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
. (2.3)
3A comprehensive analysis of the St. Petersburg paradox is provided by Samuelson
(1977).
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Proof of Theorem 2.1: Using a bounded value function vb(·) is the simplest
way to guarantee a finite CPT value. Assuming that vb is monotonically
increasing, strictly concave and bounded, i.e limz→∞ vb(z) = c, it is
straightforward to prove statement a) that, independent of the specification
of the probability weighting function w, Equation (2.1) is always strictly
smaller than c:
∞∑
k=1
vb
(
2k
) · [w (21−k)− w (2−k)] < ∞∑
k=1
c · [w (21−k)− w (2−k)] = c.
(2.4)
Hence, the maximum willingness to pay (certainty equivalent) for lottery
LSTP is finite.
For unbounded value functions v, finite willingness to pay is equivalent
to convergence of the infinite sum (2.1). The ratio test to assess the
convergence of (2.1) in case of unbounded value functions implies finite
willingness to pay if
lim
k→∞
∣∣∣∣∣v
(
2k+1
) · [w (2−k)− w (2−k−1)]
v (2k) · [w (21−k)− w (2−k)]
∣∣∣∣∣ < 1. (2.5)
If we substitute p for 21−k (probability) and z for 2k+1 (payoff), we can
restate the convergence criterion as
lim
z→∞
v (z)
v (0.5z)
· lim
p→0+
∣∣∣∣w(0.5p)− w(0.25p)w(p)− w(0.5p)
∣∣∣∣ < 1, (2.6)
which corresponds to part b). Part c) follows because, according to the
ratio test, a necessary condition for convergence is the weak version of the
inequalities above.
Note that statement c) holds for bounded as well as unbounded value
functions because for bounded and strictly increasing value functions we
yield lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 1. To see this, recall that v(0) = 0 so that strict
monotonicity and boundedness leads to lim
x→∞
v(x) = c for some upper bound
c > 0 and, thus, v(0.5z)
v(z)
−→
z→∞
c
c
= 1.
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The next theorem specializes to the case of continuous preference
functions and already adumbrates that, for smooth weighting functions,
a finite derivative of the probability weighting function at zero, w′(0) <∞,
does not guarantee a finite certainty equivalent as long as we allow for
various forms for the value function. Rather, the trade-off between the limit
of the w-ratio lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
and the limit of the v-ratio lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
is important.
Theorem 2.2 (Continuous w and the St. Petersburg paradox)
Let v : R → R be a continuous and strictly increasing value function
and w : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be a continuous and strictly increasing probability
weighting function with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1. Then, it holds for the
St. Petersburg lottery LSTP :
a) A CPT decision maker reports finite willingness to pay for LSTP if
(sufficient condition)
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
< lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
. (2.7)
b) A necessary condition for finite willingness to pay for LSTP is
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
≤ lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
. (STP ∗)
c) If in part b) the limits are equal and less than one, that is
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
∈ (0, 1), (2.8)
then the decision maker’s willingness to pay is arbitrarily large. Put
differently, no reported finite willingness to pay for LSTP can be
captured by these CPT preferences.
Proof of Theorem 2.2: The case of bounded value functions is clear from
Theorem 2.1. So, let us consider unbounded value functions. Lemma 2.1 in
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Appendix A.1 proves that for continuous probability weighting functions, it
holds:
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)− w(0.25p)
w(p)− w(0.5p) = limp→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
. (2.9)
Then, statements a) and b) are clear from Theorem 2.1.
In the situation of statement c), Lemma 2.2 in Appendix A.1 shows
that for all  > 0 there exists p0 ∈ (0, 1) such that
w(p) ≥ const ·
(p
2
)γ+
(2.10)
for all p ∈ (0, p0]. Similarly, Lemma 2.3 in Appendix A.1 ensures that for
all  > 0 there exist x0 > 0 such that
v(x) ≥ const · xα− (2.11)
for all x ≥ x0.
Now let lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 0.5γ ∈ (0, 1) for some γ > 0. Observe
that v is unbounded because otherwise, with our convention v(0) = 0, we
would have had lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 1. We use Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.2 which
give lower boundaries for the value function v for larges payoffs z and for
the probability weighting function w for small probabilities, respectively.
For any 1, 2 > 0 the CPT value can be assessed as
CPT (LSTP ) =
∞∑
k=1
v
(
2k
) · [w (21−k)− w (2−k)] (2.12)
=
∞∑
k=1
v
(
2k
)
w
(
21−k
) ·
 1− w (2−k)
w (21−k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈0.5γ for sufficiently large k and some γ > 0

(2.13)
≥ const ·
∞∑
k=k0
(
2k
)γ−1 (21−k
2
)γ+2
(2.14)
= const ·
∞∑
k=k0
(
2−1−2
)k (2.15)
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where k0 is a sufficiently large index. Equation (2.15) equals infinity if and
only if 1 + 2 = 0. Since we can choose 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 arbitrarily small,
the sum in (2.15), and hence the willingness to pay, grows arbitrarily large.
Without probability weighting (i.e. w(p) = p), the v-ratio limit
lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
has to be strictly greater than 0.5 to ensure a finite subjective
CPT value. Note that the value function’s concavity alone does not
automatically imply a v-ratio limit greater than 0.5. For example, for Bell’s
(1988) one-switch function v(x) = βx − e−αx + 1 with α, β > 0, we prove
in Example 2.4 that the v-ratio limit equals 0.5. Applying Theorem 2.2,
statement c), re-establishes the well-known fact that this concave value
function yields infinite willingness to pay for the St. Petersburg lottery
under EUT. This fact foreshadows the insights of Menger (1934) who shows
that even within the EUT framework it is possible to construct a Super
St. Petersburg paradox where many of the strictly concave utility functions
are unable to guarantee finite willingness to pay.
Continuity of the probability weighting function in Theorem 2.2 is
crucial as the following example shows:
Example 2.1 Assume a neo-additive probability weighting function w.
That is
w(p) =

0 for p = 0
a+ b · p for p ∈ (0, 1)
1 for p = 1
, (2.16)
where a+ b ≤ 1 and a, b > 0. Note that although lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= a
a
= 1, finite
willingness to pay is well possible for lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
< 1 (contrary to the case of
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continuous weighting functions) because the CPT value is given by
CPT (LSTP ) =
∞∑
k=1
v
(
2k
) · [w (21−k)− w (2−k)] (2.17)
=
∞∑
k=1
v
(
2k
) · [a+ b · (21−k)− a− b · (2−k)] (2.18)
=
∞∑
k=1
v
(
2k
) · b · 2−k. (2.19)
If lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 0.5 then Lemma 2.3 in Appendix A.1 applies and
(2.19) is larger than b
∑∞
k=k0
2(1−)k−k = b
∑∞
k=k0
(2−)k for any  > 0
and sufficiently large k0. Since we can choose  > 0 arbitrarily small,
the CPT value of the St. Petersburg lottery, CPT (LSTP ), is unbounded if
lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 0.5. Furthermore, v cannot be bounded from above. Together
with the ratio test applied to (2.19), it follows that a necessary and sufficient
condition for finite willingness to pay for LSTP is
lim
z→∞
v (0.5z)
v(z)
>
1
2
. (2.20)
In other words, neo-additive probability weighting functions have the same
implications for the St. Petersburg paradox as EUT despite the w-ratio
limit being equal to one. An obvious value function that now produces finite
willingness to pay is v(x) = x0.88 because v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 0.50.88 = 0.543.
It is clear that the limit lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
is in the interval [0, 1]. Intuitively,
the limit of this w-ratio is an index of concavity of w at probability p = 0.
More precisely, for sufficiently smooth weighting functions, Dierkes & Sejdiu
(2019a) show that it relates to a probabilistic counterpart of relative risk
aversion at p = 0 as defined here.
Definition 2.1 Let w be a probability weighting function which is twice
continuously differentiable on a subset (0, p0), p0 ∈ (0, 1), and strictly
increasing. Then we define a probabilistic counterpart of relative risk
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aversion at infinitesimally small probabilities:
RRA0w = lim
p→0+
p
w′′(p)
w′(p)
. (2.21)
Note that RRA0w > 0 indicates probabilistic risk aversion and
RRA0w < 0 probabilistic risk proclivity when processing infinitesimally small
probabilities. Using our previous definition, Dierkes & Sejdiu (2019a) show
that for smooth w and all ∆ ∈ (0, 1) it holds
lim
p→0+
w(∆p)
w(p)
= ∆1+RRA
0
w . (2.22)
That is, the limit lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
is informative about the curvature of w at
p = 0. In particular, a higher w-ratio limit indicates more concavity of w at
p = 0.
The discussion of the power value function vPower(x) = xα for α ∈ (0, 1)
is now rather simple and a particularly worthwhile example because it is
by far the most frequently used parametrization in CPT. Recall that vPower
exhibits constant relative risk aversion equal to 1 − α. There is now an
intuitive interpretation for finite willingness to pay for the St. Petersburg
lottery LSTP . Corollary 2.1 below shows that willingness to pay for LSTP is
finite if and only if the decision maker exhibits strictly positive total relative
risk aversion. Here, total relative risk aversion is the sum of probabilistic
relative risk aversion RRA0w induced by the probability weighting function
and relative risk aversion of the value function as defined by the Arrow-Pratt
measure. Put differently, to produce a lower certainty equivalent than the
expected value (infinity in this case) the decision maker must exhibit strict
risk aversion. In the CPT framework, risk aversion is driven by both
the value and the probability weighting function. Conversely, with risk
neutrality or risk proclivity, gambling for an infinite expected payoff is
desirable and decision makers are willing to pay any amount.
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Corollary 2.1 Provided w is twice continuously differentiable on a subset
(0, p0), p0 ∈ (0, 1), and strictly increasing and the value function is given
by vPower(x) = xα with α ∈ (0, 1) then the CPT decision maker has finite
willingness to pay for the St. Petersburg lottery LSTP if and only if
RRA0w +RRAv > 0, (2.23)
where RRAv = −xv′′(x)v′(x) = 1−α is the constant relative risk aversion of the
power value function v.
Proof of Corollary 2.1: Note that v(0.5z)
v(z)
∈ (0, 1) for all α > 0. According to
Theorem 2.2, parts a) and c), it suffices to show that lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
< 0.5α is
equivalent to Equation (2.23). Using ∆ = 0.5 in Equation (2.22), we get
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
< 0.5α (2.24)
⇔ 0.5RRA0w+1 < 0.5−RRAv+1 (2.25)
⇔ RRA0w > −RRAv (2.26)
which is equivalent to Equation (2.23).
To illustrate the applications of our findings, we discuss some typical
parametrizations of v and w from the literature.
Example 2.2 The convergence rate of the w-ratio w(0.5p)
w(p)
for tiny probabil-
ities for commonly employed probability weighting functions w are given as
follows:
a) For wTK92(p) = pγ/ (pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ, γ ∈ (0, 1) proposed by Tversky
& Kahneman (1992), we have lim
p→0+
wTK92(0.5p)
wTK92(p)
= 0.5γ.
b) For wlog−odds(p) = δpγ/ (δpγ + (1− p)γ), γ ∈ (0, 1), δ > 0 proposed by
Goldstein & Einhorn (1987)4, we have lim
p→0+
wlog−odds(0.5p)
wlog−odds(p)
= 0.5γ.
4It is also used by e.g Tversky & Fox (1995), and Lattimore et al. (1992).
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c) For wPrelec(p) = e−(− log p)
γ , γ ∈ (0, 1) proposed by Prelec (1998), we
have
lim
p→0+
wPrelec(0.5p)
wPrelec(p)
=

1 if γ ∈ (0, 1),
0.5 if γ = 1,
0 if γ > 1.
d) Consider polynomial probability weighting functions wPoly(p) =∑N
i=1 ai · pi with parameters ai ∈ R for i = 1, . . . , N and aN 6= 0.
Let j be the smallest index i < N such that aj 6= 0, i.e. wPoly(p) =∑N
i=j ai · pi. Then the limit is lim
p→0+
wPoly(0.5p)
wPoly(p)
= 0.5j.
The third degree polynomial weighting function wRW06(p) =
3−3b
a2−a+1 (p
3 − (a+ 1)p2 + ap)+p with a, b ∈ (0, 1) proposed by Rieger &
Wang (2006) is a special case with limit lim
p→0+
wRW06(0.5p)
wRW06(p)
= 0.5 because
a, b ∈ (0, 1) imply a1 6= 0.
Before we get to the crux of our paper, namely the restrictions on finite
willingness to pay for LSTP inhibit the emergence of the common ratio
effect, it is now easy to restate some selected results from the literature
on the willingness to pay for the St. Petersburg lottery LSTP (see, e.g.,
Blavatskyy (2005) and Rieger & Wang (2006)):
Example 2.3 Suppose the CPT decision maker exhibits a power value
function vPower(x) = xα with α ∈ (0, 1). Hence, v(0.5z)v(z) = 0.5α is independent
of z. From Theorem 2.2 and Example 2.2, we know that:
(i) With parametrization of the probability weighting function w
as in Tversky & Kahneman (1992) or Goldstein & Einhorn
(1987), i.e. wTK92(p) = pγ/ (pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ or wlog−odds(p) =
δpγ/ (δpγ + (1− p)γ), respectively, the willingness to pay for the
St. Petersburg lottery LSTP is finite if and only if α < γ.
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(ii) With the Prelec (1998) parametrization wPrelec(p) = e−(− log p)
γ , finite
willingness to pay for the St. Petersburg lottery LSTP implies γ ≥ 1. In
other words, finite willingness to pay is not possible with the inverse S-
shaped probability weighting function wPrelec. This result foreshadows
the conflict with the common ratio effect which exactly requires an
inverse S-shaped probability weighting function.
(iii) The CPT decision maker states finite willingness to pay for LSTP for
all polynomial probability weighting functions because 0.5α > 0.5j for
all coefficient indices j = 1, 2, . . . as in Example 2.2, part d).
Example 2.4 Suppose the CPT decision maker exhibits Bell’s (1988) one-
switch function v(x) = βx−e−αx+1 which is unbounded, strictly increasing,
and strictly concave for α > 0 and β > 0. Then,
lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= lim
z→∞
β0.5z − e−α0.5z + 1
βz − e−αz + 1
l′Hospital
= lim
z→∞
0.5β + 0.5αe−α0.5z
β + αe−αz
= 0.5
and from Theorem 2.2, statement c) and Examples 2.2, we know that:
(i) For parametrizations of the probability weighting function w as
in Tversky & Kahneman (1992), Goldstein & Einhorn (1987), or
Prelec (1998) i.e. wTK92(p) = pγ/ (pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ, wlog−odds(p) =
δpγ/ (δpγ + (1− p)γ), or wPrelec(p) = e−(− log p)γ , respectively, an
inverse-S shaped weighting function w never leads to finite willingness
to pay for the St. Petersburg lottery LSTP because γ ∈ (0, 1). If γ > 1
then willingness to pay is finite.
(ii) Consider polynomial probability weighting functions wPoly(p) =∑N
i=1 ai · pi with parameters ai ∈ R for i = 1, . . . , N and aN 6= 0.
Then, willingness to pay for LSTP is finite if and only if a1 = 0. In
particular, a probability weighting function’s finite slope at probability
p = 0 is not enough to guarantee finite willingness to pay for the
St. Petersburg lottery.
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2.2.2 The common ratio effect under CPT
The Allais paradox is a traditional counterexample against EUT and comes
along in different versions. We focus on the common ratio version which
involves choices between equal mean lotteries5
L1(p) = ($z, 0.5p; $0, 1− 0.5p) and L2(p) = ($0.5z, p; $0, 1− p) (2.27)
where z > 0 denotes a payoff amount and p a probability. Empirically,
subjects choose the safer lottery L2 for high probabilities p and the riskier
lottery L1 for low probabilities p.6 EUT’s independence axiom, however,
does not allow for this change in preference over L1 and L2 for varying
probabilities p.
By introducing probability weighting, CPT is able to explain this choice
behavior. In the CPT framework, a risk seeking choice is predicted when
CPT (L1) > CPT (L2)
⇔ v(z) · w(0.5p) + v(0) · [1− w(0.5p)] > v(0.5z) · w(p) + v(0) · [1− w(p)]
(2.28)
⇔ w(0.5p)
w(p)
− v(0.5z)− v(0)
v(z)− v(0) > 0 (2.29)
and a risk averse choice results vice versa. Using Assumption 2 whereby
v(0) = 0, we define the common ratio effect with the help of Equation (2.29).
Definition 2.2 (Common ratio effect) Let v be a value function and w
be a probability weighting function. We say that, in this CPT framework
with equal mean lotteries L1(p) = ($z, 0.5p; $0, 1− 0.5p) and L2(p) =
5More generally, the results of this section easily extend to lotteries L1(p) =
($z,∆p; $0, 1−∆p) and L2(p) = ($∆z, p; $0, 1− p) with ∆ ∈ (0, 1). However, to analyze
the conflict with the St. Petersburg paradox, we focus on lotteries with payoff and
probability ratio of ∆ = 0.5 which is a common choice in experiments.
6Lottery L1(p) is called riskier than the lottery L2(p) because L1(p) is a mean-
preserving spread of L2(p).
30
2.2. THE ALLAIS - ST. PETERSBURG CONFLICT
($0.5z, p; $0, 1− p) with payoff z > 0, the common ratio effect is predicted
if and only if there exists exactly one sign change in function
fCRE(p) =
w(0.5p)
w(p)
− v(0.5z)
v(z)
, (2.30)
that is, there exists exactly one preference reversal probability p∗ such that
fCRE(p) > 0 for p ∈ (0, p∗) and fCRE(p) < 0 for p ∈ (p∗, 1].
This definition already foreshadows the conflict between the common
ratio effect and the necessary conditions for finite willingness to pay for the
St. Petersburg Lottery as stated in Theorem 2.2. This definition is also a
little stricter than we need for our purposes. We can relax the assumption of
a single preference reversal probability as long as there exists a probability p∗
such that fCRE(p) > 0 for p ∈ (0, p∗). Put differently, we need to assume
that, for sufficiently small probabilities p, the decision maker chooses the
riskier lottery which we find is an intuitive criterion. Nevertheless, multiple
preference reversal probabilities appear awkward as they would imply, at
odds with lab results, rather erratic behavior.
The following proposition is a trivial consequence of the previous
definition and explicitly states necessary conditions for the common ratio
effect.
Proposition 2.1 (Emergence of the common ratio effect)
Let v be a value function and w be a probability weighting function.
Consider the equal mean lotteries L1(p) = ($z, 0.5p; $0, 1− 0.5p) and
L2(p) = ($0.5z, p; $0, 1− p). Then it holds:
a) For fixed payoff z, one necessary condition7 for the prediction of the
7There are more necessary conditions, of course. This one, however, unveils the
conflict with finite willingness to pay for the St. Petersburg lottery LSTP . Another obvious
necessary condition is lim
p→1
w(0.5p)
w(p) = w(0.5) ≤ v(0.5z)v(z) .
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common ratio effect as defined in Definition 2.2 is
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
≥ v(0.5z)
v(z)
. (CRE)
b) Allais (1953) suggests that statement a) holds for all payoffs z, in
particular large payoffs. This leads to the necessary condition:
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
≥ lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
. (CRE∗)
Clearly, if the v-ratio v(0.5z)
v(z)
is independent of the payoff z then the
two necessary conditions CRE and CRE∗ coincide. This is the case for
the power value function vPower(x) = xα, α ∈ (0, 1) which is the, by far,
most often employed parametrization of the value function. Further, the
necessary conditions CRE∗ in Proposition 2.1 and STP ∗ in Theorem 2.2,
respectively, leave at best a corner solution for many CPT calibrations. Put
together, both restrictions require for continuous w
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
. (2.31)
However, statement c) in Theorem 2.2 rules out such cases where
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
∈ (0, 1). (2.32)
In particular, using a power value function vPower for which always
lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
∈ (0, 1), will always result in a strict conflict between the
restrictions on the St. Petersburg and the Allais paradox if the probability
weighting function is continuous.
The remaining case lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 1 is ruled out by the
following proposition.
Proposition 2.2 Let w be a strictly increasing and continuous probability
weighting function and v be a strictly increasing value function with v(0) =
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0. If lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 1 then the common ratio effect does not emerge for
large payoffs z in lotteries L1(p) = ($z, 0.5p; $0, 1− 0.5p) and L2(p) =
($0.5z, p; $0, 1− p). Put differently, by increasing z, the preference reversal
probability p∗, given by the intersection of function fCRE(p) = w(0.5p)w(p) − v(0.5z)v(z)
with the abscissa, can be moved arbitrarily close to zero if it exists at all.
Proof of Proposition 2.2: Since 0 ≤ w(0.5p)
w(p)
≤ 1 for all probabilities p and
lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 1, the function fCRE(p) = w(0.5p)w(p) − v(0.5z)v(z) is, for p → 0+,
either negative or arbitrarily close to zero for sufficiently high payoffs z.
That is, the intersection probability p∗, also denoted the preference reversal
probability, moves for large z arbitrarily close to zero if it exists at all.
Bounded value functions always imply finite willingness to pay for the
St. Petersburg lottery. However, the following corollary shows that they have
difficulties predicting the Allais paradox because bounded value functions
always have a v-ratio limit equal to one.
Corollary 2.2 Let v be a bounded and strictly increasing value function
with v(0) = 0. Then the common ratio effect does not emerge for
large payoffs z in lotteries L1(p) = ($z, 0.5p; $0, 1− 0.5p) and L2(p) =
($0.5z, p; $0, 1− p) because, by increasing z, the preference reversal prob-
ability p∗, given by the intersection of function fCRE(p) = w(0.5p)w(p) − v(0.5z)v(z)
with the abscissa, can be moved arbitrarily close to zero if it exists at all.
Proof of Corollary 2.2: For bounded strictly increasing value functions v
with v(0) = 0, it holds: lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 1. Assume lim
x→∞
v(x) = b for some
upper bound b > 0. Hence, v(0.5z)
v(z)
−→
z→∞
b
b
= 1. Then, the statement follows
from Proposition 2.2.
Before we summarize these findings in our main Theorem 2.4 and
discuss further the, by now clear, tension between the two presumably
most prominent paradoxes in decision theory, we illustrate implications of
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Definition 2.2 with Figure 2.1. This illustration is worthwhile for several
reasons. First, some calibrations from the literature do not predict the
common ratio effect while others do. Second, we show that several preference
reversal points are theoretically possible. Third, it nicely hints at the role
of Proposition 2.2 although we use the power value function. Fourth, it
indicates similarities and differences between the weighting functions wTK92,
wlog−odds, wPrelec, wPoly, and wneo.
Figure 2.1 depicts function fCRE as defined in Definition 2.2. We focus
on Tversky & Kahneman’s (1992) CPT parametrization in Panel A and vary
the specification of the probability weighting function in Panel B. Since we
assume the power value function vPower(x) = xα, no assumption about
the lottery payoffs z is needed. Specifically, Panel A depicts the following
function:
fTK92(p) = 0.5
γ ·
[
pγ + (1− p)γ
(0.5p)γ + (1− 0.5p)γ
] 1
γ
− 0.5α. (2.33)
Positive function values of (2.33) indicate risk seeking behavior and negative
values risk averse behavior. The black solid line depicts an individual’s risk
attitude when assuming Tversky & Kahneman’s (1992) suggested median
parameters α = 0.88 and γ = 0.61. In line with Definition 2.2, a risk seeking
choice is predicted for p < 0.91 and a risk averse choice otherwise. Estimates
(α, γ) = (0.77, 0.67), taken from Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000), make similar
predictions. The decision maker behaves risk averse roughly for probabilities
p > 0.81 and risk seeking otherwise. Interestingly, parameter estimations
by Camerer & Ho (1994) and Wu & Gonzalez (1996) who estimate the
parameter sets (α, γ) = (0.37, 0.56) and (α, γ) = (0.50, 0.71), respectively,
uniformly display risk aversion for all probabilities p and, hence, do not
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Panel A: Common ratio effect for different parameter sets (α, γ) of Tversky &
Kahneman’s (1992) CPT parametrization.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
−
0.
3
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
p
R
is
k 
se
ek
in
g
R
is
k 
av
e
rs
e
TK92 with γ = 0.61
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Log−Odds with γ = 0.55, δ =0.82
Polynomial with a=0.4, b=0.5
Neo−additive with a=0.05, b=0.8
Panel B: Common ratio effect for various probability weighting functions.
Figure 2.1: Common ratio effect under CPT.
Notes: This figure illustrates the common ratio effect under various parametrizations of CPT by
depicting the function fCRE(p) = w(0.5p)/w(p)−v(0.5z)/v(z) as a function of probability p. The
decision maker has the choice between the equal mean lotteries L1(p) = ($z, 0.5p; $0, 1− 0.5p)
and L2(p) = ($0.5z, p; $0, 1− p). For positive function values fCRE , she behaves risk seeking
and prefers the riskier lottery L1 over the safer lottery L2. Conversely, for negative values fCRE ,
she behaves risk averse and prefers L2 over L1. In Panel A, the individual’s preferences are
given by the value function v(x) = xα and the weighting function wTK92 for different parameter
sets (α, γ) including those estimated in Tversky & Kahneman (1992), Camerer & Ho (1994),
Wu & Gonzalez (1996), and Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000) denoted in the legend by TK92, CH94,
WG96, and BP00, respectively. In Panel B, the value function is fixed as v(x) = x0.88 (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992) and the weighting function takes the forms wTK92, wlog−odds, wPrelec, wRW06,
and wneo. Due to the form of the value function, no assumption about z is needed. Function
values of fCRE are depicted for weighting functions with parameter estimates of Tversky &
Kahneman (1992) for TK92, estimates of Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000) for Prelec and Log-odds,
parameter values motivated by Rieger & Wang (2006) for a cubic weighting function, and the
neo-additive weighting function with intercept a = 0.05 and slope b = 0.8, respectively.
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explain the common ratio effect.8 However, as argued in Section 2.2.1, these
parameter combinations are in line with finite willingness to pay for the
St. Petersburg lottery because α < γ.
In addition, we plot two illustrative pairs of preference parameters.
Cases where α = γ < 1 are interesting in the Tversky & Kahneman
(1992) parametrization because they robustly predict a single preference
reversal point with risk prone behavior for low probabilities p (positive
fCRE) and risk averse behavior for larger probabilities p (negative fCRE),
but the limiting case in Equation (2.33) yields limp→0 fCRE(p) = 0. Panel
A illustrates the case α = γ = 0.61.
Interestingly, the pair α = 0.5 and γ = 0.61 has two preference reversal
points, yielding risk prone behavior for intermediate probabilities between
0.1 and 0.38 and risk averse behavior otherwise. Such cases are bad empirical
predictors because real decision makers exhibit a single preference reversal
point with lower probabilities typically leading to more risk prone choices.
Panel B of Figure 2.1 illustrates that this problem also arises for
weighting functions with finite slope at zero such as the cubic weighting
function wRW06(p) = 3−3ba2−a+1 (p
3 − (a+ 1)p2 + ap) + p of Rieger & Wang
(2006), see also Proposition 2.3 and Example 2.5 below. In the context of
our paper, the failure of the polynomial weighting function wRW06 to explain
the common ratio effect is particularly interesting since it was primarily
designed to explain the St. Petersburg paradox (Rieger & Wang, 2006).
Moreover, Panel B fixes the value function as v(x) = x0.88 and
shows that the image of fCRE is for the approximate range 0.56 ≤
p ≤ 1 very similar for all four continuous probability weighting functions
8Neilson & Stowe (2002) note that the parameter estimates of Camerer & Ho (1994)
and Wu & Gonzalez (1996) are unable to predict gambling on unlikely gains and the
choice behavior of Allais’ original common consequence example. In contrast to Neilson &
Stowe (2002), we do not call for new parametrizations of CPT. Our Allais - St. Petersburg
test evaluates CPT in its most general form and does not rely on specific parametrizations
of the value and probability weighting function.
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wTK92, wlog−odds, wPrelec, and wRW06 with standard parameter values but
significantly different for lower probabilities 0 ≤ p ≤ 0.56. While wTK92 and
wlog−odds seem to treat all probabilities very similar, wPrelec and wRW06 go
into the opposite direction when probabilities get smaller. This discrepancy
nicely foreshadows the conflict between the conditions of the Allais and
St. Petersburg paradox since both weighting functions are motivated by
one paradox, respectively. Note that Prelec (1998) motivates his probability
weighting function wPrelec(p) = e−(− log p)
γ with Allais’ common ratio effect.
Similarly, the discontinuous neo-additive weighting function results in a
strictly decreasing function fCRE and predicts the common ratio effect.
Figure 2.1 also shows that fCRE does not need be a monotone function in p.
Monotonicity is guaranteed, however, if we use a subproportional probability
weighting function such as wPrelec (Prelec, 1998) or neo-additive ones.
The next proposition shows that a combination of a probability
weighting function with finite slope at zero and a strictly concave value
function cannot explain the common ratio effect.
Proposition 2.3 Let the value function v be strictly concave and let the
probability weighting function w be right-differentiable around zero and the
slope of w at zero be finite, i.e. w′(0+) = c with 0 ≤ c < ∞. Then,
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
≤ 0.5 and the CPT decision maker always prefers the safer
lottery L2(p) = ($0.5z, p; $0, 1− p) over L1(p) = ($z, 0.5p; $0, 1− 0.5p) for
any payoff z > 0 when the probabilities p and 0.5p tend to zero. In particular,
the common ratio effect does not emerge.
Proof of Proposition 2.3: If w is monotonically increasing with w(0) = 0,
w(1) = 1 and w′(0+) = c, 0 < c < ∞, then applying the rule of l’Hopital
directly shows that
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
l′Hopital
= lim
p→0+
w′(0.5p) · 0.5
w′(p)
=
w′(0) · 0.5
w′(0)
= 0.5 . (2.34)
37
CHAPTER 2. THE NEED FOR DISCONTINUOUS PROBABILITY
WEIGHTING FUNCTIONS: HOW CPT IS TORN BETWEEN THE ALLAIS
PARADOX AND THE ST. PETERSBURG PARADOX
For w′(0) = 0, the general monotonicity assumption of w ensures that there
exists a p0 ∈ (0, 1] such that w is convex for p ∈ [0, p0], i.e. w(0.5p) ≤
0.5w(p).
Since v is strictly concave it follows that 0.5 < v(0.5z)
v(z)
< 1 for any z > 0
and
lim
p→0+
fCRE(p) = lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0.5
− v(0.5z)
v(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0.5
< 0 (2.35)
which is equivalent to L2  L1. This, however, contradicts the empirical
evidence of the common ratio effect and, hence, Definition 2.2.
In light of Example 2.1, the next proposition shows that neo-additive
weighting functions are a prime candidate to solve both paradoxes.
Proposition 2.4 Let w be the neo-additive probability weighting function
with intercept a and slope b with a, b > 0 and a+ b ≤ 1. Then the common
ratio effect emerges between Lotteries L1 and L2 with payoffs determined by
z if and only if
a+ 0.5b
a+ b
<
v(0.5z)
v(z)
< 1. (2.36)
Proof of Proposition 2.4: Observe that the function fCRE(p) = wneo(0.5p)wneo(p) −
v(0.5z)
v(z)
is strictly decreasing in p:
∂fCRE
∂p
= − 0.5 · a · b
(a+ b · p)2 < 0 ∀ p ∈ (0, 1) if a, b > 0. (2.37)
Since limp→0+ fCRE(p) = 1 − v(0.5z)v(z) and limp→1 fCRE(p) = a+0.5ba+b − v(0.5z)v(z) ,
the common ratio effect then emerges if and only if the conditions in the
proposition are fulfilled.
The class of neo-additive weighting functions is the simplest class
of weighting functions that allows a solution to both paradoxes. In
Subsection 2.2.3, we will show how to extend the class of weighting functions
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so as to accommodate more complex choice behavior for intermediate
probabilities (Harless & Camerer, 1994; Wu & Gonzalez, 1996). We conclude
this subsection with two examples.
Example 2.5 Let the value function v be strictly concave. With polynomial
probability weighting functions wPoly(p) =
∑N
i=1 ai·pi with parameters ai ∈ R
for i = 1, . . . , N and aN 6= 0, the choice behavior in the common ratio effect
according to Definition 2.2 cannot be predicted. To see this, note that it
holds 0 ≤ w′Poly(0) <∞. Then, Proposition 2.3 applies.
Example 2.6 Consider wPrelec(p) = e−(− log p)
γ proposed by Prelec (1998).
It is subproportional and lim
p→0+
wPrelec(0.5p)
wPrelec(p)
= 1 for γ ∈ (0, 1), see
Example 2.2. Assume the value function is given by vLog(x) = log(1 +
x). Then, lim
p→0+
wPrelec(0.5p)
wPrelec(p)
= lim
z→∞
vLog(0.5z)
vLog(z)
= 1 is a corner case for
the necessary conditions (CRE∗) and (STP ∗). However, the empirically
observed common ratio effect cannot be predicted because of Proposition 2.2.
Intuitively, by using ever larger payoffs z in the common ratio lotteries L1
and L2, as is supported by experimental evidence in Allais (1953), we can
move the preference reversal probability p∗ arbitrarily close to zero.
Interestingly, Example 2.8 in Appendix A.2 shows that the combination of
vLog and wPrelec produces finite willingness to pay for the St. Petersburg
lottery. Theoretically then, smaller payoffs z might offer a solution to
both paradoxes with vLog and wPrelec. However, a sensitivity analysis in
Appendix A.2 unveils for various combinations of v and continuous w that
only unreasonably small z would do the trick.
2.2.3 Summary: Allais - St. Petersburg conflict in CPT
We summarize our findings in the following theorems which distinguish
between discontinuous and continuous probability weighting functions.
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Specifically, in the latter case of continuous weighting functions, no solution
exists, in particular for large payoffs. In the former case of discontinuous
weighting functions, the class of neo-additive weighting functions opens
the door for a broader class of weighting functions which can additionally
accommodate more complex choice behavior as found, for example, by
Harless & Camerer (1994) than neo-additive functions which are linear for
probabilities in (0, 1).
In the following, we shall include explicit statements about the power
value function because of its predominant use in the literature although
it constitutes a trivial corollary of more general results. Cases where for
fixed payoff z and z/2 in lotteries L1 and L2, respectively, it holds v(0.5z)v(z) <
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 1 are not covered here. They might theoretically
allow for finite willingness to pay for the St. Petersburg lottery LSTP and the
emergence of the common ratio effect for small or maybe even moderately
large payoffs z. A sensitivity analysis in Appendix A.2, however, rules out
any realistic cases for specific parametrizations.
Theorem 2.3 (Simultaneous solution to both paradoxes)
Let wneo be defined by
w(p) =

0 for p = 0
a+ b · p for p ∈ (0, 1)
1 for p = 1
, (2.38)
with a, b > 0 and a + b ≤ 1. Let further v be a continuous and strictly
increasing value function. The common ratio lotteries are given by L1(p) =
($z, 0.5p; $0, 1− 0.5p) and L2(p) = ($0.5z, p; $0, 1− p) with z > 0. Then it
holds:
a) Let the probability weighting function be given by wneo. Assume
the decision maker strictly prefers the risky lottery L1 over L2 for
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probabilities near zero and the safe lottery L2 over L1 for probabilities
near one for all sufficiently high payoffs z. This is equivalent to
a+0.5b
a+b
< v(0.5z)
v(z)
< 1 for all payoffs z ≥ z0 for some z0 >
0. Furthermore, in those cases, the decision maker states finite
willingness to pay for playing the St. Petersburg lottery LSTP .
In other words, a+0.5b
a+b
< v(0.5z)
v(z)
< 1 for all payoffs z ≥ z0 for some z0 >
0 is equivalent to the simultaneous solution of both the St. Petersburg
paradox and the common ratio version of the Allais paradox for all
sufficiently large payoffs in the common ratio lotteries.
b) Assume the probability weighting function is given by w(p) = wneo ◦
wcont.(p) = wneo(wcont.(p)), where wcont. is a continuous and strictly
increasing probability weighting function. If the decision maker states
finite willingness to pay for playing the St. Petersburg lottery LSTP
and strictly prefers the risky lottery L1 over L2 for probabilities near
zero and the safe lottery L2 over L1 for probabilities near one for all
sufficiently high payoffs z ≥ z0, z0 > 0, then for all z ≥ z0 it holds
(necessary conditions)
a+ bwcont.(0.5)
a+ b
<
v(0.5z)
v(z)
, (2.39)
1 >
v(0.5z)
v(z)
, (2.40)
lim
p→0+
wcont.(0.5p)
wcont.(p)
≤ lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
. (2.41)
c) Assume that, in the situation of part b), all inequalities hold strictly
and the function fCRE(p) = w(0.5p)w(p) − v(0.5z)v(z) has, for every fixed z, a
single intersection point p∗ ∈ (0, 1) with the abscissa, that is, there is
a single preference reversal probability p∗ between the common ratio
lotteries L1 and L2. Then, both Allais’ common ratio effect for all fixed
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payoffs z and a finite willingness to pay for the St. Petersburg lottery
emerge.
Proof of Theorem 2.4: We start by proving a). The common ratio effect
for all payoffs z ≥ z0 for some z0 > 0 is, by Proposition 2.4, equivalent
to 1 > v(0.5z)/v(z) > a+0.5b
a+b
for all z ≥ z0. In those cases, it holds that
1 ≥ lim
z→∞
v(z)
v(0.5z)
≥ a+0.5b
a+b
> 0.5 because a+0.5b
a+b
> 0.5 for a > 0. From
Example 2.1, then, lim
z→∞
v(z)
v(0.5z)
> 0.5 is equivalent to the finite willingness
to pay for playing LSTP .
For statement b), similar arguments as for Proposition 2.4 show that
the common ratio effect implies a+bwcont.(0.5)
a+b
< v(0.5z)/v(z) < 1 which
proves Equations (2.39) and (2.40). Theorem 2.1 gives a necessary condition
for convergence of the CPT value for the St. Petersburg lottery as follows:
lim
z→∞
v (z)
v (0.5z)
· lim
p→0+
∣∣∣∣w(0.5p)− w(0.25p)w(p)− w(0.5p)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1. (2.42)
After substituting w(p) = wneo(wcont.(p)) we get
lim
z→∞
v (z)
v (0.5z)
· lim
p→0+
∣∣∣∣wcont.(0.5p)− wcont.(0.25p)wcont.(p)− wcont.(0.5p)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1 (2.43)
which, given the continuity of wcont. and Lemma 2.1 in Appendix A.1, leads
to
lim
p→0+
wcont.(0.5p)
wcont.(p)
≤ lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
. (2.44)
This last equation is the same as Equation (2.41).
Statement c) is clear because the first two Inequalities (2.39) and (2.40)
guarantee the common ratio effect with a single preference reversal point
and the previous arguments with the ratio test show that the strict version
of the last Inequality (2.41) is sufficient for the solution of the St. Petersburg
paradox (see also Theorem 2.1).
Note that although Prelec’s (1998) probability weighting function itself
is a prime candidate to predict the common ratio effect it is likely less
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successful to also predict the St. Petersburg paradox when combined with
the neo-additive probability weighting function because of condition (2.41).
We provide two simple examples for a solution to both paradoxes.
Example 2.7 a) Let the value function be given by v(x) = xα with α =
0.7 and the neo-additive probability weighting function be given by a =
0.1 and b = 0.8. Then, the certainty equivalent or, equivalently, the
willingness to pay for the St. Petersburg lottery equals
CE(LSTP ) := v
−1
( ∞∑
k=1
v
(
2k
) · [w (21−k)− w (2−k)]) (2.45)
=
[ ∞∑
k=1
2αk · b · 2−k
] 1
α
(2.46)
=
[
b ·
∞∑
k=1
(
0.51−α
)k] 1α (2.47)
α<1
=
[
b
21−α − 1
] 1
α
= 5.892. (2.48)
It it also clear from Theorem 2.3, part a), that the common ratio
effect is predicted because a+0.5b
a+b
= 5
9
< v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 0.5α = 0.616 < 1. The
preference reversal probability is given by
a+ b · 0.5p∗
a+ b · p∗
!
= 0.5α (2.49)
⇔ p∗ = a (1− 0.5
α)
b (0.5α − 0.5) = 0.416 (2.50)
and is well in line with ranges proposed by Kahneman & Tversky
(1979) and Starmer & Sugden (1989).
b) Let the value function be given by v(x) = xα, α > 0, and the probability
weighting function be given by w(p) = wneo◦wcont.(p) = wneo(wcont.(p))
where the neo-additive weighting function wneo is given by intercept
a > 0 and slope b > 0 and the continuous weighting function
wcont.(p) = p
γ, γ > 0.
43
CHAPTER 2. THE NEED FOR DISCONTINUOUS PROBABILITY
WEIGHTING FUNCTIONS: HOW CPT IS TORN BETWEEN THE ALLAIS
PARADOX AND THE ST. PETERSBURG PARADOX
Then, Inequality (2.40) is fulfilled because v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 0.5α < 1 ∀α > 0;
Inequality (2.41) holds strictly if α < γ. Function fCRE(p) = w(0.5p)w(p) −
v(0.5z)
v(z)
is strictly decreasing in p since its derivative is negative for all
p ∈ (0, 1):
∂fCRE
∂p
= −abγ (1− 0.5
γ) pγ−1
(a+ bpγ)2
< 0 (2.51)
and Inequality (2.39) then ensures a single intersection with the
abscissa.
Specifically, for α = 0.88, a = 0.1, b = 0.8, and γ = 2, Equation (2.39)
is fulfilled because 0.1+0.8·0.5
2
0.1+0.8
= 1
3
< 0.50.88 = 0.543. The preference
reversal probability equals
p∗ =
[
a (1− 0.5α)
b (0.5α − 0.5γ)
] 1
γ
= 0.441. (2.52)
The certainty equivalent of the St. Petersburg lottery is
CE(LSTP ) =
[ ∞∑
k=1
2αk · b · 2−γk · (2γ − 1)
] 1
α
(2.53)
=
[
b(2γ − 1) ·
∞∑
k=1
(
0.5γ−α
)k] 1α (2.54)
=
[
b(2γ − 1)
2γ−α − 1
]1/α
= 2.255. (2.55)
However, when preferences are given by continuous functions, no
simultaneous solution to both paradoxes exists:
Theorem 2.4 (Continuity and the conflict between both paradoxes)
Assume decision makers behave according to CPT with continuous and
strictly increasing value function v and continuous and strictly increasing
probability weighting function w. The common ratio lotteries are given by
L1(p) = ($z, 0.5p; $0, 1− 0.5p) and L2(p) = ($0.5z, p; $0, 1− p) with z > 0.
a) Assume the common ratio effect shows up for all payoffs z, in
particular for large payoffs z as argued by Allais (1953). Then, there
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does not exist a simultaneous solution to both the St. Petersburg
paradox and the common ratio effect.
b) Assume v(x) = xα with α > 0. Then, there does not exist a
simultaneous solution to both the St. Petersburg paradox and the
common ratio effect.
Proof of Theorem 2.4: We start by proving statement a). Any solution
to both paradoxes requires that lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
because of
Theorem 2.2, part b), and Proposition 2.1. Now, two cases can occur:
1) If lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
∈ (0, 1) then the decision maker always
states infinite willingness to pay for the St. Petersburg lottery LSTP
(see Theorem 2.2, statement c)). This is at odds with the empirical
observation whereby decision makers report finite willingness to pay.
2) If lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 1 then, by increasing the payoff z in
lotteries L1 and L2, we can move the preference reversal probability p∗
arbitrarily close to zero which rules out a solution to the common ratio
effect. This is proven in Proposition 2.2.
Note that the case lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 0 can be ruled out. To see
this, observe that a risk averse choice in the common ratio effect for large
probabilities (p→ 1) implies the necessary condition lim
p→1
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= w(0.5) ≤
lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
. Since w is strictly increasing and w(0) = 0, this necessary
condition can never be fulfilled when lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 0.
Statement b) is a trivial corollary of case 1) because the v-ratio v(0.5z)
v(z)
equals 0.5α ∈ (0, 1) independent of payoff z.
Admittedly, allowing payoffs z and 0.5z in lotteries L1 and L2,
respectively, to grow infinitely large in Condition (CRE∗) is extreme. In
special cases, such as the power value function, this is not necessary because
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then the v-ratio v(0.5z)
v(z)
is independent of z. Here, the conflict between both
paradoxes appears directly. For other parametrizations of the value function,
calibration exercises in Appendix A.2 unveil that already moderately large
payoffs z run counter real world decision makers’ behavior.
Note also that the conflict between finite willingness to pay in the
St. Petersburg paradox and choice behavior as in the common ratio effect
is not a simple artifact of the preference reversal phenomenon, reported
in e.g. Lichtenstein & Slovic (1971). The preference reversal phenomenon
describes the puzzling fact that while subjects choose lottery A over lottery
B they simultaneously state higher certainty equivalents for lottery B
than for lottery A. Accounting for preference reversal effects, however,
makes the conflict between both paradoxes even more severe. To see this,
note that many studies of the preference reversal phenomenon involve
mean-preserving spread lotteries, similar to our L1 and L2. Empirically,
when subjects choose between L1 and L2, they have a tendency to exhibit a
more risk averse choice behavior going for L2 than their willingness to pay
suggests. Suppose, for given payoff z, choices indicate indifference between
L1 and L2 for some probability p. Then, switching from a choice to a
pricing task and asking for certainty equivalents would typically indicate
a preference for the riskier lottery L1 according the preference reversal
effect. Tversky et al. (1990) attribute this to more extreme overweighting
of small probabilities in pricing tasks. In the Tversky & Kahneman
(1992) framework, for example, this would be equivalent to an even lower
probability weighting parameter γCertainty Equivalent than revealed by previous
choices, that is γCertainty Equivalent < γChoice. But quite to the contrary, the
St. Petersburg paradox, which also involves a pricing task by stating a
certainty equivalent, requires a higher curvature parameter γ for finite
willingness to pay.
Finally, truncating the St. Petersburg lottery does not help much for
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typical parametrizations. Appendix A.3 analyzes various specifications with
truncation levels up to a payment of $240, that is, roughly one trillion dollar.
The essence of our previous conclusions remains unchanged.
2.3 Conclusion
It is striking that so many textbooks on decision theory start by outlining
the St. Petersburg paradox and the Allais paradox when motivating EUT
and CPT, respectively. However, a joint consideration of both paradoxes
has, to the best of our knowledge, never been done before. Since CPT is
widely accepted as the gold standard of descriptive theories of decision
making under risk and uncertainty, we study a potential discrepancy
between these two paradoxes within the framework of CPT. Our results
can be extended to other theories of decision making under risk with similar
additively separable utility across states.
The main result of our paper is that CPT with continuous preference
functions is not able to simultaneously explain the two most prominent
paradoxes in decision making under risk – the St. Petersburg paradox and
the Allais paradox. All attempts to solve to the Allais - St. Petersburg
conflict by changing the parametrizations of the CPT preference calculus
within the class of continuous functions are in vain. Rather, future research
shall embrace discontinuous weighting functions, such as neo-additive
weighting functions (Wakker, 2010) and their obvious nonlinear extensions.
In particular, exact calibrations are in order because neo-additive weighting
functions can have vastly different predictions than their nonlinear
extensions (consider, for example, pricing implications in capital markets, as
in Barberis & Huang, 2008). Using field data, Barseghyan et al. (2013) made
a first attempt in this direction, indicating a jump at probability zero and
explicitly rejecting continuous weighting functions. While they do not offer
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much advice on probabilities larger than 25%, Harless & Camerer (1994)
andWu & Gonzalez (1996) suggest nonlinearities for moderate probabilities.
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A Appendix
A.1 Lemmata
Lemma 2.1 Suppose both limits below exist. Then, for a continuous and
strictly increasing probability weighting function w, it holds
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)− w(0.25p)
w(p)− w(0.5p) = limp→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
. (A.1)
Proof of Lemma 2.1: Strict monotonicity of w ensures that w(0.5p)
w(p)
∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
∈ [0, 1]. The same is true for w(0.5p)−w(0.25p)
w(p)−w(0.5p) as the
following arguments show.
Monotonicity of w implies that w(0.5p)−w(0.25p)
w(p)−w(0.5p) ≥ 0. Assume, for proof
by contradiction, that
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)− w(0.25p)
w(p)− w(0.5p) = λ > 1. (A.2)
Then, we can find p0 ∈ (0, 1) such that
w(0.5p)− w(0.25p)
w(p)− w(0.5p) > 1 (A.3)
for all sufficiently small probabilities p ∈ (0, p0] and for those p we have
w(0.5p)− w(0.25p) > w(p)− w(0.5p). (A.4)
Note that the last inequality also applies to probabilities pˆ = 0.5p which
leads to
w(0.52p)− w(0.53p) > w(0.5p)− w(0.52p) > w(p)− w(0.5p) (A.5)
and by iteration
w(0.5np)− w(0.5n+1p) > w(p)− w(0.5p) for all n = 1, 2, . . . . (A.6)
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Then w(p) can be written as a telescoping series for all probabilities p ∈
(0, p0) and we yield the following inequality:
w(0.5p) =
∞∑
n=1
(
w (0.5np)− w(0.5n+1p)) ≥ ∞∑
n=1
(w(p))− w(0.5p)) =∞
(A.7)
which is a contradiction. Hence, w(0.5p)−w(0.25p)
w(p)−w(0.5p) ∈ [0, 1].
We now prove Equation (A.1) by distinguishing cases. As a first case,
suppose that lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
< 1. Then
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)− w(0.25p)
w(p)− w(0.5p) = limp→0+
1− w(0.25p)/w(0.5p)
1− w(0.5p)/w(p) · limp→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
and both limits are equal.
In particular, if lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)−w(0.25p)
w(p)−w(0.5p) = 1 then it cannot be that
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
< 1. Hence, Equation (A.1) holds if lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)−w(0.25p)
w(p)−w(0.5p) = 1.
As the last case, suppose lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= 1. Assume, for proof by
contradiction, that lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)−w(0.25p)
w(p)−w(0.5p) < 1. By similar arguments as above,
we can find λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
w(0.5p)− w(0.25p)
w(p)− w(0.5p) ≤ λ < 1 (A.8)
for all sufficiently small probabilities p less than some p0 ∈ (0, 1). By
iteration and using a telescoping series, we get
w(0.5p) =
∞∑
n=1
(
w(0.5np)− w(0.5n+1p)) (A.9)
≤
∞∑
n=1
λn (w(p))− w(0.5p)) = λ
1− λ (w(p))− w(0.5p)) . (A.10)
This last inequality is equivalent to
w(0.5p)
w(p)
≤ λ (A.11)
and, given that λ < 1, this is a contradiction. Hence, in any case,
Equation (A.1) holds provided both limits exist.
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Lemma 2.2 Let lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= 0.5γ ∈ (0, 1). Then, for all  > 0 there exists
p0 ∈ (0, 1) such that
w(p) ≥ const ·
(p
2
)γ+
(A.12)
for all p ∈ (0, p0].
Proof of Lemma 2.2: Assume lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= 0.5γ ∈ (0, 1). Then for any
 > 0 it holds 0.5γ ≥ 0.5γ+. Hence, it exists a p0 ∈ (0, 1) such that for all
p ∈ (0, p0]
w (0.5p) ≥ 0.5γ+w(p) . (A.13)
Equation (A.13) holds in particular for p0 and iterating n times yields
w (0.5np0) ≥ 0.5n(γ+)w(p0) = (0.5np0)γ+ w(p0)
pγ+0
≥ (0.5np0)γ+ w(p0)
pγ0
.
(A.14)
For any p ∈ (0, p0] we choose n ∈ {1, 2, . . .} such that
0.5np0 < p ≤ 0.5n−1p0. (A.15)
Then, it holds
w(p) >w (0.5np0) (A.16)
≥ (0.5np0)γ+ w(p0)
pγ0
(A.17)
=0.5γ+
(
0.5n−1p0
)γ+ w(p0)
pγ0
(A.18)
≥
(p
2
)γ+ w(p0)
pγ0
(A.19)
=const ·
(p
2
)γ+
(A.20)
Lemma 2.3 Let lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 0.5α ∈ (0, 1). Then, for all  > 0 there exist
x0 > 0 such that
v(x) ≥ const · xα− (A.21)
for all x ≥ x0.
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Proof of Lemma 2.3: Assume lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 0.5α ∈ (0, 1). Then for any  > 0
it holds 0.5α ≤ 0.5α−. Hence, it exists a x0 > 0.5 such that for all x ≥ x0
v(0.5x) ≤ 0.5α−v(x). (A.22)
Equation (A.22) holds in particular for x0 and iterating n times yields
v(2nx0) ≥ 2n(α−)v(x0). (A.23)
For any x ≥ x0, we choose n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} such that
2nx0 ≤ x < 2n+1x0. (A.24)
Then, it holds
v(x) ≥v (2nx0) (A.25)
≥2n(α−)v(x0) (A.26)
=
(
2n+1x0
)α− v(x0)
(2x0)α−
(A.27)
≥xα− v(x0)
(2x0)α
(A.28)
=const · xα− (A.29)
A.2 Sensitivity analysis for the common ratio effect
with small payoffs
From our analyses in the main part of the paper it is clear that potentially
interesting cases require small or only moderately large payoffs z in lotteries
L1 and L2 and value functions with lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 1. This restriction excludes
Tversky & Kahneman’s (1992) suggested power value function v(x) = xα
and Bell’s (1988) one-switch function. Linear and quadratic utility functions
are clearly unable to explain both paradoxes. Table A.1 lists the remaining
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Table A.1: Functional forms for the value function v in gains.
Type Function v(x) Parameter
restriction
Bounded
utility
v(0.5z)
v(z)
lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
Exponential 1− e−αx α > 0 yes 1− e
−α0.5z
1− e−αz 1
Logarithmic log(1 + αx) α > 0 no
log (1 + α0.5z)
log (1 + αz)
1
HARA 1−α
α
[(
x
1−α + β
)α
− βα
]
α < 0, β > 0 yes [0.5z/(1−α)+β]
α−βα
[z/(1−α)+β]α−βα 1
typical forms of promising value functions. For these ones, we perform a
sensitivity analysis to gauge the set of payoff amounts z for which the
common ratio effect can be predicted.
Exponential value function
A promising alternative parametrization is the use of the exponential value
function v(x) = 1 − e−αx with α > 0. This value function is bounded and,
thus, automatically ensures finite willingness to pay for the St. Petersburg
lottery (Theorem 2.2, a)). It holds that lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 1. To simultaneously
predict the common ratio effect, a probability weighting function with
lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= 1 is presumably most promising. A prime candidate would
be the commonly used weighting function wPrelec(p) = e−(− log p)
γ with
γ ∈ (0, 1) as proposed by Prelec (1998).
Recall that, by Definition 2.2 of the common ratio effect, the decision
maker behaves risk seeking for all probabilities p ∈ (0, p∗) and risk averse
for all p ∈ (p∗, 1]. Technically, we solve the following equation for any pair
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Figure 2.2: Preference reversal points for the exponential value
and Prelec weighting function combination.
Notes: This figure depicts preference reversal points p∗ under CPT by solving
w(0.5p∗)/w(p∗) − v(0.5z)/v(z) = 0 for the pairs (p∗, αz). The decision maker
has the choice between the equal mean lotteries L1(p) = ($z, 0.5p; $0, 1− 0.5p)
and L2(p) = ($0.5z, p; $0, 1− p). The individual’s preferences are given by the
bounded value function v(x) = 1 − e−αx, α > 0 and Prelec’s (1998) probability
weighting function w(p) = e−(− log p)γ , γ ∈ (0, 1). The three lines indicate
individual’s preference reversal points for γ = {0.53, 0.74, 0.94}. The use of these
three parameter estimates is motivated by Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000), Wu &
Gonzalez (1996), and Stott (2006), respectively.
(p∗, αz):
CPT (L1)
!
= CPT (L2)
⇔ w(0.5p
∗)
w(p∗)
=
v(0.5z)
v(z)
(A.30)
⇔ e
−(− log(0.5p∗))γ
e−(− log p∗)γ
=
1− e−0.5αz
1− e−αz (A.31)
Equation (A.31) determines the decision maker’s indifference point between
the lotteries L1 and L2 in (2.27) for given constant absolute risk aversion
coefficient α and payoff z.
Figure 2.2 depicts the preference reversal point p∗ as a function of αz
for the three weighting function parameter estimates γ = {0.53, 0.74, 0.94}
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reported in Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000), Wu & Gonzalez (1996), and Stott
(2006), respectively. For all three specifications, p∗ quickly converges to
zero when αz increases. Problems 7 and 8 in Kahneman & Tversky (1979)
conservatively suggest that, empirically, 0.002 < p∗ < 0.9. Thus, even the
lowest estimate γ = 0.53 of Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000) requires αz < 3.617
to ensure the lower boundary of the empirically observed reversal point p∗ >
0.002. The typical payoff z = $6000 leads to α < 3.617/6000 ≈ 0.000603
which is an unreasonably low constant absolute risk aversion. To the
contrary, De Giorgi & Hens (2006) suggest for the exponential value function
the parameter value α ≈ 0.2. The typical z = $6000 implies αz = 1, 200
which results in a v-ratio that is just infinitesimally smaller than one. Hence,
only when γ tends to zero – quite at odds with all calibration studies – the
w-ratio equals one and the common ratio effect emerges theoretically. An
alternative interpretation is that CPT counterfactually predicts a preference
for risky lottery L1(p = 0.002) only for z < $18.08. This is at odds with
experiments that show less frequent Allais type behavior for low payoffs
(Camerer, 1989; Conlisk, 1989; Fan, 2002; Huck & Müller, 2012; Agranov
& Ortoleva, 2017). We conclude that the combination of the exponential
value function and Prelec’s (1998) subproportional weighting function is no
viable solution to both paradoxes.
Recall that for probability weighting functions in, e.g., Tversky &
Kahneman (1992) and Goldstein & Einhorn (1987), it holds lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
=
0.5γ. Because limγ→0 0.5γ = 1, a sufficiently low γ and sufficiently low
payoff z, can theoretically explain both paradoxes in similar cases with
low αz combinations. Table A.2 provides a sensitivity analysis. It depicts
for exponential, logarithmic and HARA value functions and various (α, z)
combinations the maximum curvature parameter γ of the probability
weighting function that still predicts the common ratio effect. Evidently,
with the exponential value functions, payoffs of the order of z = 6.000 are
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Table A.2: Numerical upper boundaries for the curvature
parameter γ of the Tversky & Kahneman (1992) or Goldstein &
Einhorn (1987) weighting function for different values of α and z
such that the common ratio effect is predicted.
Payoff z
Type v Upper boundary for γ $100 $1,000 $6000 $20,000 $100,000
Exponential
log
(
1−e−α0.5z
1−e−αz
)
log(0.5)
α = 0.001 0.96 0.68 0.07 0 0
α = 0.01 0.68 0.01 0 0 0
α = 0.1 0.01 0 0 0 0
Logarithmic
log
(
log(1+α0.5z)
log(1+αz)
)
log(0.5)
α = 0.5 0.27 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.10
α = 1 0.23 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.09
α = 2 0.2 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.08
HARA
(β = 1)
log
(
[0.5z/(1−α)+β]α−βα
[z/(1−α)+β]α−βα
)
log(0.5)
α = −0.25 0.14 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02
α = −0.5 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.01 0
α = −1 0.03 0 0 0 0
sufficient to wipe out the common ratio effect unless unrealistic preference
parameters are assumed. For example, with z = 6.000 and an extremely low
α = 0.001, the curvature parameter γ cannot exceed 0.07. Larger α values
are even more problematic.
Logarithmic value function
Next, we consider a logarithmic value function v(x) = log(1 + αx) with
α > 0. This value function exhibits sufficiently high risk aversion such
that the CPT decision maker reports finite willingness to pay for the
St. Petersburg lottery for typical probability weighting functions wTK92,
wlog−odds, or wPrelec. While the former two cases are a simple application of
Theorem 2.2, finite willingness to pay in the latter case (wPrelec) deserves
special attention in Example 2.8 below because lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 1.
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Example 2.8 Assume the value function is given by v(x) = log(1 + αx)
with α > 0 and the probability weighting function is given by wPrelec(p) =
e−(− log p)
γ proposed by Prelec (1998). Then lim
p→0+
w(0.5p)
w(p)
= lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 1 and
the CPT decision maker states finite willingness to pay for LSTP .
Proof of Example 2.8: Observe that
wPrelec
(
21−k
)
= e−((k−1) log(2))
γ
< e−(k−1)
γ log(2) = 2−(k−1)
γ
. (A.32)
For any given α > 0, it exists a k¯ ∈ N≥1 such that for all k ∈ N≥k¯
log
(
1 + α2k
)
< log
(
α2k+1
)
= log(2α) + k log(2). (A.33)
Then, the CPT value in Equation (2.1) is finite. As a first step we have
CPT (LSTP ) =
∞∑
k=1
log
(
1 + α2k
) · [wPrelec (21−k)− wPrelec (2−k)] (A.34)
<
∞∑
k=1
log
(
1 + α2k
) · wPrelec (21−k) (A.35)
=
k¯−1∑
k=1
log
(
1 + α2k
) · wPrelec (21−k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=c<∞
+
∞∑
k=k¯
log
(
1 + α2k
) · wPrelec (21−k)
(A.36)
< c+
∞∑
k=k¯
[log(2α) + k log(2)] · 2−(k−1)γ (A.37)
= c+
∞∑
k=k¯−1
[log(2α) + (k + 1) log(2)] · 2−kγ (A.38)
= c+ log(4α)
∞∑
k=k¯−1
2−k
γ
+ log(2)
∞∑
k=k¯−1
k2−k
γ
. (A.39)
The first term in (A.39) is a constant and the series
∑∞
k=k¯−1 2
−kγ is strictly
smaller than the series
∑∞
k=k¯−1 k2
−kγ . To assess convergence, it suffices to
prove convergence of
∑∞
k=0 k2
−kγ . The integral test, using the substitution
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x = kγ · log(2) with dk
dx
= 1
γ
(
1
log(2)
) 1
γ
x
1
γ
−1, shows convergence because∫ ∞
0
k2−k
γ
dk =
∫ ∞
0
ke−k
γ ·log(2)dk (A.40)
=
1
γ
log(2)−
2
γ
∫ ∞
0
x
2
γ
−1e−xdx (A.41)
=
1
γ
log(2)−
2
γ · Γ
(
2
γ
)
<∞, (A.42)
where Γ is the well known Gamma function.
Further, observe that wPrelec is subproportional and γ ∈ (0, 1) is a
necessary condition for the common ratio effect. The following function,
corresponding to function (2.30) depicted in Figure 2.1,
fwPrelec,vCRE∗ (p) =
w(0.5p)
w(p)
− lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
=
w(0.5p)
w(p)
− 1, (A.43)
is, thus, strictly monotonically decreasing in p and limp→0+ f
wPrelec,v
CRE∗ (p) = 0.
In other words, there is no preference reversal point p∗ and, thus, no common
ratio effect.
A sensitivity analysis is worthwhile because there might be a
realistically large set of moderate payoffs z for which condition (CRE)
is satisfied. Solving Equation (A.30) with wPrelec, vLog, and z = 6000
gives preference reversal points of virtually zero. The value is roughly
p∗ ≈ 7.32 × 10−11 for γ = 0.53 reported in Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000).
For larger γ, as reported in e.g. Wu & Gonzalez (1996) and Stott (2006),
the preference reversal point is even closer to zero.
Figure 2.3 depicts the preference reversal probability p∗ dependent on
the payoff z in lotteries L1 and L2. It unveils that p∗ quickly converges to
zero for moderately large payoffs. Convergence is faster for higher curvature
parameters γ. For z = 400, the Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000) estimate γ = 0.53
is not distinguishable from zero. In fact, this moderate case implies p∗ ≈
4.5× 10−5.
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Figure 2.3: Preference reversal points for the logarithmic value
and Prelec weighting function combination.
Notes: This figure depicts preference reversal points p∗ under CPT by solving
w(0.5p∗)/w(p∗) − v(0.5z)/v(z) = 0 for the pairs (p∗, z). The decision maker
chooses between the equal mean lotteries L1(p) = ($z, 0.5p; $0, 1− 0.5p) and
L2(p) = ($0.5z, p; $0, 1− p). The individual’s preferences are given by the
bounded value function v(x) = log(1+x) and Prelec’s (1998) probability weighting
function w(p) = e−(− log p)γ , γ ∈ (0, 1). The three lines indicate individual’s
preference reversal points for γ = {0.53, 0.74, 0.94}. The use of these three
parameter estimates is motivated by Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000), Wu & Gonzalez
(1996), and Stott (2006), respectively.
Table A.2 kills any hope for wTK92 and wlog−odds. For example, using
the typical amount z = 6000, condition (CRE) implies γ < 0.12 which is
unrealistically low. Further, Camerer & Ho (1994), Rieger & Wang (2006),
and Ingersoll (2008) show that for γ ≤ 0.28, wTK92 is not monotonically
increasing.
HARA value function
Our last candidate value function is the HARA value function vHARA(x) =
1−α
α
((
x
1−α + β
)α − βα) with α < 0 and β > 0. As the function is
bounded from above it automatically ensures finite willingness to pay in the
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Figure 2.4: Preference reversal points for the HARA value and
Prelec weighting function combination.
Notes: This figure depicts preference reversal points p∗ under CPT on the ordinate
and risk aversion parameter α on the abscissa by solving w(0.5p∗)/w(p∗) −
v(0.5z)/v(z) = 0 for the pairs (p∗, α). The individual’s preferences are given
by the bounded value function v(x) = 1−αα
((
x
1−α + β
)α − βα) with α < 0 and
normalized β = 1 and Prelec’s (1998) probability weighting function w(p) =
e−(− log p)γ , γ ∈ (0, 1). The three lines indicate individual’s preference reversal
points for γ = {0.53, 0.74, 0.94}. The use of these three parameter estimates
is motivated by Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000), Wu & Gonzalez (1996), and Stott
(2006), respectively. The decision maker chooses between the equal mean lotteries
L1(p) = ($z, 0.5p; $0, 1− 0.5p) and L2(p) = ($0.5z, p; $0, 1− p). The upper panel
depicts the risk aversion parameter α if we fix z = 5 and the lower panel shows α
for z = 10.
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St. Petersburg paradox. However, Table A.2 unveils even more unrealistic
calibrations for the curvature parameter γ for the Tversky & Kahneman
(1992) or Goldstein & Einhorn (1987) probability weighting functions.
For example, if we use the typical payoff z = 6000 and value function
parameters α = −1 and β = 1 the largest plausible parameter would
be γ = 0.00048 which is neither supported by empirical calibrations nor
supported by – in the Tversky & Kahneman (1992) case – our stochastic
dominance assumption of a strictly increasing w (see, e.g., Camerer & Ho
(1994), Rieger & Wang (2006), or Ingersoll (2008)).
Figure 2.4 provides the results of a similar analysis with Prelec’s (1998)
probability weighting function wPrelec. It depicts preference reversal points
p∗ on the ordinate and risk aversion parameter α on the abscissa by solving
w(0.5p∗)
w(p∗) − v(0.5z)v(z) = 0 for the pairs (p∗, α). Since the convergence of the
preference reversal probability p∗ to zero is so fast we depict the special
case z = 5 and z = 10 in the upper and lower panel, respectively. As before,
we use γ = {0.53, 0.74, 0.94}. For γ = 0.94 convergence is too quick to
visualize it in one of the graphs. These effects are considerably stronger for
larger values z. We conclude that using the HARA value function does not
yield practical solutions to both paradoxes.
A.3 Truncated St. Petersburg lotteries
As our testing ground, we propose the St. Petersburg paradox and the
Allais paradox because of their outstanding prominence and importance for
the development of new theories of decision making under risk throughout
the history of risky decision making. Some readers might feel tempted to
change this playing field. Especially the infinite expected payoff of the
St. Petersburg lottery sometimes spurs criticism. We consider this to be
scientific foul play. True, willingness to pay for the original St. Petersburg
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Figure 2.5: Certainty equivalents for the truncated
St. Petersburg gamble under CPT.
Notes: This figure illustrates the willingness to pay CE
(
L
(N)
STP
)
= v−1
(
CPT
(
L
(N)
STP
))
for the
truncated St. Petersburg lottery where N = 2, . . . , 40 determines the maximum payoff $2N . The
truncated gamble promises a payoff of $2k with probability 0.5k for k = 1, . . . , N−1 and a payoff
of $2N with probability 0.5N−1. In Panel A, the individual’s preferences are given by the value
function v(x) = xα and the probability weighting function wTK92(p) = pγ/ (pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ
for different parameter sets (α, γ) including those estimated in Tversky & Kahneman (1992),
Camerer & Ho (1994), Wu & Gonzalez (1996), and Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000) denoted in
the legend by TK92, CH94, WG96, and BP00, respectively. In Panel B, the value function
is consistently v(x) = x0.88 (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and the weighting function takes the
forms wTK92, wlog−odds(p) = δpγ/ (δpγ + (1− p)γ), wPrelec(p) = e−(− log p)γ , and wRW06(p) =
3−3b
a2−a+1
(
p3 − (a+ 1)p2 + ap) + p. Certainty equivalents CESTP are depicted for weighting
functions with parameter estimates of Tversky & Kahneman (1992) for wTK92, estimates of
Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000) for wPrelec and wlog−odds, and parameter values motivated by Rieger
& Wang (2006) for wRW06, respectively. The gray dashed line represents the expected value of
the lottery.
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lottery LSTP is difficult to elicit with monetary incentives. Nevertheless,
stated willingness to pay in hypothetical scenarios is reliable, though noisy
and real incentives would not change our conclusions (Holt & Laury, 2002,
2005).9
A typical concern is that subjects do not trust promises to payout
in the St. Petersburg lottery above a certain threshold (Tversky & Bar-
Hillel, 1983). Resorting to truncated versions of the St. Petersburg lottery,
however, is not much more than grasping at straws, as we shall see. Let L(N)STP
denote the truncated St. Petersburg lottery which yields a payoff $2k with
probability 0.5k for k = 1, . . . , N − 1 and a payoff of $2N with probability
0.5N−1. The expected value of this lottery equals N + 1 and corresponds to
N − 1 possible rounds of coin flipping.10
By all indications, subjects behave risk averse in the original as well as
the truncated St. Petersburg lottery L(N)STP (Bernoulli, 1738, 1954; Bottom
et al., 1989; Rivero et al., 1990; Baron, 2008; Hayden & Platt, 2009;
Neugebauer, 2010; Cox et al., 2011; Seidl, 2013; Erev et al., 2017; Cox
et al., 2019). Specifically, Hayden & Platt (2009) show in an experimental
study with real monetary payments that individuals’ willingness to pay is
hardly affected by truncating the lottery. They find that bids on truncated
St. Petersburg lotteries are typically smaller than twice the smallest payoff,
that is $4 for L(N)STP . Cox et al. (2011) show that the majority of their
subjects behave risk averse in the finite St. Petersburg gamble especially
for N ≥ 6. For N = 9, 83% of their participants rejected the gamble for
a price of $8.75, thus indicating risk averse behavior. The proportion of
subjects rejecting the gamble for a price slightly lower than the expected
9Note that infinite willingness to pay can also emerge from finite expected payoff
gambles (Rieger & Wang, 2006).
10For example, for N = {10, 20, 30, 40} the maximum payoffs are $210, $220, $230,
and $240 which roughly equal 1 thousand, 1 million, 1 billion, and 1 trillion dollars,
respectively.
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value increased monotonically with N . Moreover, Erev et al. (2017) show
that risk aversion in the St. Petersburg paradox is also robust to feedback
(with real monetary incentives).
In the CPT framework, Figure 2.5 depicts the willingness to pay
CE
(
L
(N)
STP
)
= v−1
(
CPT
(
L
(N)
STP
))
as a function of N for the truncated
St. Petersburg gamble, whereN = 2, . . . , 40 determines the maximum payoff
$2N , for the most common parametrizations. Panel A shows the certainty
equivalents CE
(
L
(N)
STP
)
for Tversky & Kahneman’s (1992) parametrization
of the value and probability weighting function, that is vPower(x) = xα
and wTK92(p) = pγ/ (pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ, for different parameter sets (α, γ) as
estimated in Tversky & Kahneman (1992), Camerer & Ho (1994), Wu &
Gonzalez (1996), and Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000). Parameter combinations
with α ≥ γ predict a certainty equivalent that increases exponentially
with N and illustrate once more infinite willingness to pay for N → ∞
(see Theorem 2.2 or Example 2.3). The empirical evidence on truncated
St. Petersburg lotteries clearly rejects such parameter combinations.11
Surprisingly, the hypothetical parameter combination (α, γ) = (0.50, 0.61)
implies risk proclivity for N = 7, . . . , 29, that is higher certainty
equivalents than expected payoff (gray dashed line) although this preference
combination yields finite willingness to pay for N → ∞. Predicted and
actual willingness to pay can deviate by substantial amounts, though both
are finite. One interpretation is that our formerly applied criterion of finite
willingness to pay is rather conservative if benchmarked against actual
willingness to pay.
We derive similar conclusion from Panel B which fixes the value func-
tion as v(x) = x0.88 and uses probability weighting functions wTK92(p) =
11The empirical evidence mentioned above overwhelmingly supports risk averse
behavior in truncated St. Petersburg lotteries and risk proclivity is merely a thought
experiment (Tversky & Bar-Hillel, 1983) or an artificially induced observation where
individuals were framed to a risk-seeking choice (Erev et al., 2008).
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pγ/ (pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ with γ = 0.61, wlog−odds(p) = δpγ/ (δpγ + (1− p)γ)
with γ = 0.55 and δ = 0.82, wPrelec(p) = e−(− log p)
γ with γ = 0.53, and
wRW06(p) =
3−3b
a2−a+1 (p
3 − (a+ 1)p2 + ap) + p with a = 0.4 and b = 0.5. The
parameter values are motivated by Tversky & Kahneman (1992) for wTK92,
Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000) for wPrelec and wlog−odds, and Rieger & Wang
(2006) for the cubic weighting function wRW06.
Just like with wTK92, we see that the standard parametrization of
the two weighting functions wPrelec and wlog−odds also predict unreasonably
high willingness to pay for finite values of N . Interesting is the case of the
polynomial weighting function wRW06 which implies a willingness to pay of
$26.18 for N →∞. We yield risk seeking behavior for N = 3, . . . , 18 which
correspond to maximum payoffs of $8; $16; . . . ; $262, 144. This prediction
does not match the empirical fact mentioned above.
In summary, truncating the original St. Petersburg lottery does not
change the essence of our previous conclusions.
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Chapter 3
Salience Theory and the
Allais - St. Petersburg Conflict∗
3.1 Introduction
Descriptive theories of choice under risk aim to rationalize human choice
behavior. But what characterizes a "good" descriptive model? Obviously,
the model has to accommodate as many empirically observed choice
patterns as possible while being manageable and falsifiable. George Box
once remarked that “all models are wrong, but some are useful.”(Box,
1979, p. 202) “The practical question is how wrong do they have to be
to not be useful.”(Box & Draper, 1987, p. 74) In the context of descriptive
decision theories, his quotes imply that the first step is to define what the
minimum standard for descriptive models is in order to be able to reject
a model. Dierkes & Sejdiu (2019b) recently propose the joint consideration
of the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953) and Bernoulli’s St. Petersburg paradox
(Bernoulli, 1738, 1954) as the new minimum standard of descriptive decision
∗This chapter is based on the Working Paper “Salience Theory and the Allais -
St. Petersburg Conflict” authored by Maik Dierkes and Vulnet Sejdiu, 2019.
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theories. They motivate this minimum standard with the outstanding
historical importance of both paradoxes and the failure of Tversky &
Kahneman’s (1992) Cumulative Prospect Theory to accommodate both
paradoxes simultaneously.
In this paper, we analyze the predictions of Bordalo et al.’s (2012)
Salience Theory in the St. Petersburg paradox and the common ratio version
of the Allais’ paradox. Salience Theory is a recently developed promising
context-depended descriptive theory for choice under risk. Successful
applications vary from asset pricing over consumer choice to judicial
decisions (see, e.g., Bordalo et al., 2013a,b, 2015). The theory models a Local
Thinker whose preferences are determined by a value function v, a salience
function σ, and a probability-distortion parameter δ ∈ (0, 1). The Local
Thinker re-weights probabilities for states dependent on the salience of the
respective outcomes in these states. The probability-distortion parameter δ
drives the re-weighting of probabilities. δ = 1 corresponds to the case
where there is no re-weighting at all and the Local Thinker’s risk attitude
is solely driven by the value function v. A lower value δ reflects more
extreme re-weighting. The exact re-weighting of probabilities also depends
on payoff’s relative salience across states. Throughout this paper, we
follow Bordalo et al. (2012) and focus on the nonparametric ranking-based
probability distortion. Specifically, probabilities get distorted by δk where
k denotes the salience rank given by the general salience function σ. In
particular, we only assume that the value function v is strictly monotonically
increasing with v(0) = 0 and that the salience function σ satisfies the
conditions ordering and diminishing sensitivity (see Bordalo et al., 2012,
Definition 1).
Our main result is that Salience Theory can resolve the Allais -
St. Petersburg conflict with one set of parameters if we truncate the
St. Petersburg lottery – which avoids offering lotteries with infinite expected
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payoff. Here, Salience Theory has an edge over most Cumulative Prospect
Theory calibrations and, of course, Expected Utility Theory. Dierkes &
Sejdiu (2019b) prove that, for Cumulative Prospect Theory with continuous
preference functions, any solution to Allais’ common ratio effect predicts
– at odds with experimental evidence – huge willingness to pay for the
St. Petersburg lottery, easily exceeding the expected payoff of the truncated
St. Petersburg lottery. In contrast, Salience Theory with an exponential
value function v(x) = 1 − e−x and a probability-distortion parameter
δ = 0.4 simultaneously predicts a reasonable willingness to pay of $7.86
($12.33) for the St. Petersburg lottery truncated at the maximum payoff of
$220 ≈ 1 million ($240 ≈ 1 trillion) dollars and an empirically substantiated
preference reversal probability p∗ ≈ 1
3
for the common ratio lotteries
L1(p) = ($6000, 0.5p; $0, 1− 0.5p) and L2(p) = ($3000, p; $0, 1− p) where p
is a probability.
With unbounded payoffs, however, Salience Theory cannot predict both
paradoxes because that requires the following two conflicting conditions:
lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
≥ 1
2δ
, (St. Petersburg paradox)
lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
<
1
2δ
. (Common ratio effect)
Using the limit in the latter condition accommodates the peculiarity that
Allais’ common ratio effect emerges in particular for large payoffs (Allais,
1953).
Obviously, both conditions directly refuse the often chosen power value
function v(x) = xα, α > 0, because then the limit of the v-ratio simplifies to
lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 0.5α. This case also includes the linear value function. Bordalo
et al. (2012) choose a linear value function and δ = 0.7 to explain the Allais
paradox, consistent with the above condition. However, their specification
cannot explain finite willingness to pay for the St. Petersburg lottery.
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Furthermore, we prove that the probability distortion in Salience
Theory can be significantly stronger than in Cumulative Prospect Theory.
Yet another necessary condition for finite willingness to pay in the
St. Petersburg paradox is δ > 0.5 – independent of the value function v.
Hence, a probability-distortion parameter δ ≤ 0.5 can fully override the
impact of the value function’s curvature. For comparison, under Cumulative
Prospect Theory, an individual’s overall risk attitude is always determined
by both the value and the probability weighting function (Dierkes & Sejdiu,
2019b).
Another interesting implication of this latter finding is that the use
of bounded value functions does not necessarily solve the St. Petersburg
paradox under Salience Theory. The intuition is that, for δ ≤ 0.5, the ever
growing payoffs are salient and so strongly overweighted that the willingness
to pay for the St. Petersburg lottery diverges for any monotonically
increasing value function. Note that, under Cumulative Prospect Theory or
Expected Utility Theory, bounded value functions solve the St. Petersburg
paradox (e.g. Dierkes & Sejdiu, 2019b; Rieger & Wang, 2006). Experimental
calibration exercises should, thus, pay special attention to estimating the
probability-distortion parameter δ because this is the much more sensitive
parameter in Salience Theory (see also Königsheim et al., 2019).
Our paper complements the relatively new strand of literature which
tests Salience Theory empirically and theoretically. In particular, we are, to
the best of our knowledge, the first to examine the St. Petersburg paradox
under Salience Theory. Frydman & Mormann (2018) test Salience Theory
by conducting two choice experiments. In their first experiment, they vary
the correlation between lottery options and in their second experiment, they
use a phantom lottery to manipulate the perception of payoffs. In contrast to
Expected Utility Theory and Cumulative Prospect Theory, Salience Theory
is able to explain the results caused by the perceptual manipulations. Nielsen
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et al. (2018) present an alternative experimental test of Salience Theory
where subjects have to bet on a risky option under different treatments. The
experimental results support Salience Theory’s prediction that the salience
of preferred consequences increases the attractiveness of the risky option.
Königsheim et al. (2019) provide a first calibration of Salience Theory. Their
empirical estimates roughly support the parameterization of Bordalo et al.
(2012) (linear value function and δ ≈ 0.7). Moreover, they find that the
estimates of the probability-distortion parameter δ are not significantly
affected by the assumption of a concave value function (standard CRRA
function). However, the estimate of δ is significantly smaller when a lottery’s
downside is more salient. Kontek (2016) shows that the certainty equivalent
of a lottery can be undefined for some ranges of probabilities and that
monotonicity violations can occur.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 3.2 and 3.3
evaluate the original St. Petersburg paradox and the common ratio version
of the Allais paradox with Salience Theory, respectively. Section 3.4 analyzes
the conflict between the conditions of both paradoxes. In particular, we
distinguish between an unbounded payoff analysis (Section 3.4.1), where
payoffs can grow infinitely large (as in the original example), and a bounded
payoff analysis (Section 3.4.2), where the maximum payoff is limited to
a certain amount. Finally, we conclude with Section 3.5. An appendix
complements the paper with selected formal proofs.
3.2 Bernoulli’s St. Petersburg paradox under
Salience Theory
Throughout our discussion, we make the following assumptions (see, e.g.,
Bordalo et al., 2012; Dierkes & Sejdiu, 2019b).
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Assumption 3.1 (Preference Calculus)
a) The decision maker (Local Thinker) behaves according to Bordalo
et al.’s (2012) Salience Theory where preferences are determined by
a value function v, a salience function σ, and a probability-distortion
parameter δ ∈ (0, 1).
b) The Local Thinker’s value function v is continuous and strictly
monotonically increasing with v(0) = 0.
c) The salience function σ satisfies the two conditions ordering and
diminishing sensitivity of Definition 1 in Bordalo et al. (2012) on
p. 1249.
Assumption 3.2 (Mathematical Notation) Our notation limx→z f(x)
implies that the limit exists in a weak sense, namely limes superior and
limes inferior are equal and limx→z f(x) ∈ [−∞,∞].
In order to evaluate Bernoulli’s (1738, 1954) prominent St. Petersburg
lottery with Salience Theory, we consider a truncated St. Petersburg gamble,
where $2N is the maximum payoff, and compute the limit for N →∞:1
L
(N)
STP =

(
2k; 2−k
)
for k = 1, . . . , N − 1(
2N ; 21−N
)
for k = N .
(3.1)
As suggested by Bordalo et al. (2012) on p. 1271, we infer the willingness
to pay for L(N)STP by calculating the certainty equivalent when the lottery is
considered in isolation, i.e. against a sure outcome of zero. Then, the state
1We do this because the construction of the salience ranking is easier to understand
for the truncated St. Petersburg lottery. For fixed N , we work with the natural minimal
state space. Splitting states, however, would not alter evaluation or choice under Salience
Theory (see Bordalo et al., 2012).
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space equals S := {(2, 0), (4, 0), . . . , (2N , 0)}. For any salience function σ
satisfying the ordering condition of Definition 1 in Bordalo et al. (2012),
the salience ranking for the St. Petersburg lottery is:
σ(2N , 0) > σ(2N−1, 0) > . . . > σ(2, 0).
The original St. Petersburg lottery is given by LSTP = limN→∞ L
(N)
STP and
the Local Thinker (LT) assigns the following value to LSTP :
V LT (LSTP ) = lim
N→∞
V LT
(
L
(N)
STP
)
= lim
N→∞
21−N · δ · v (2N)+ N−1∑
k=1
2k−N · δk+1 · v (2N−k)
21−N · δ +
N−1∑
k=1
2k−N · δk+1
(3.2)
= lim
N→∞
(
1
2δ
)N · v (2N)+ N−1∑
k=0
(
1
2δ
)N−k · v (2N−k)
(
1
2δ
)N
+
N−1∑
k=0
(
1
2δ
)N−k
(3.3)
= lim
N→∞
(
1
2δ
)N · v (2N)+ N∑
k=1
(
1
2δ
)k · v (2k)
(
1
2δ
)N
+
N∑
k=1
(
1
2δ
)k . (3.4)
The following proposition states necessary conditions for finite willingness
to pay for LSTP .
Proposition 3.1 (Necessary conditions for STP) Given the Assump-
tions 3.1 and 3.2, if Salience Theory predicts a finite willingness to pay for
the St. Petersburg lottery LSTP then:
δ >
1
2
, (3.5)
and
lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
≥ 1
2δ
. (ST.STP ∗)
Proof of Proposition 3.1: We conduct a proof by contraposition to derive
the first necessary condition (3.5). More precisely, we show that δ ≤ 0.5
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leads to an infinite certainty equivalent for the St. Petersburg lottery LSTP .
It then follows that δ > 0.5 is a necessary condition for a finite certainty
equivalent v−1
(
V LT (LSTP )
)
.
An infinite certainty equivalent is predicted by Salience Theory if and
only if limN→∞ V LT (LN) = limx→∞ v(x). Hence, we have to prove that the
parameter restriction 0 < δ ≤ 0.5 leads to limN→∞ V LT (LN) = limx→∞ v(x).
Since both the numerator and denominator of fraction (3.4) contain variants
of the geometric series, we separately consider the two cases δ = 0.5 and
0 < δ < 0.5 for ease of exposition.
If δ = 0.5, Equation (3.4) can be rewritten to:
V LT (LSTP ) = lim
N→∞
v
(
2N
)
1 +N
+ lim
N→∞
1
1 +N
N∑
k=1
v
(
2k
)
(3.6)
= lim
N→∞
v
(
2N
)
1 +N
+ lim
N→∞
v (N) (3.7)
=
∞ if v is unbounded, i.e. limx→∞ v(x) =∞v(∞) = c if v is bounded, i.e. limx→∞ v(x) = c <∞ .
(3.8)
Going from (3.6) to (3.7) is obvious. The proof, however, is available upon
request. Note that Assumption 3.1 only assumes that v is continuous and
monotonically increasing. Additionally, we distinguish between bounded
and unbounded value functions v. Equation (3.8) shows that the certainty
equivalent v−1
(
V LT (LSTP )
)
is infinite in both cases.
Now, we consider the case 0 < δ < 0.5. Then, Equation (3.4) can be
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rewritten as:
V LT (LSTP ) = lim
N→∞
1− 2δ
2− 2δ − (2δ)N ·
[
v
(
2N
)
+
N∑
k=1
(2δ)N−k · v (2k)]
(3.9)
=
1− 2δ
2− 2δ ·
[
lim
N→∞
v
(
2N
)
+ lim
N→∞
N−1∑
k=0
(2δ)k · v (2N−k)] (3.10)
=
1− 2δ
2− 2δ ·
[
1 +
∞∑
k=0
(2δ)k
]
· lim
N→∞
v
(
2N
)
(3.11)
=
1− 2δ
2− 2δ ·
[
1 +
1
1− 2δ
]
· lim
N→∞
v
(
2N
)
(3.12)
= lim
N→∞
v
(
2N
)
. (3.13)
This shows that δ ∈ (0, 0.5) also leads to an infinite certainty equivalent
for LSTP . Thus, a finite certainty equivalent implies δ > 0.5. Note that the
rewriting from (3.10) to (3.11) also holds for bounded value functions. Given
that limN→∞ v
(
2N
)
= c ∈ R+, then ∀ > 0 ∃N0 : c − v
(
2N−k
)
<  ∀N0 ≤
N − k and
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣∣ c1− 2δ −
N−1∑
k=0
(2δ)k · v (2N−k)∣∣∣∣∣
≤ lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣∣ c1− 2δ −
[
N−N0∑
k=0
(2δ)k · v (2N−k)+ N−1∑
k=N−N0+1
(2δ)k · v (2N−k)]∣∣∣∣∣ (3.14)
≤ lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣∣ c1− 2δ −
[
(c− ) ·
N−N0∑
k=0
(2δ)k +
N−1∑
k=N−N0+1
(2δ)k · v (2N−k)]∣∣∣∣∣ (3.15)
≤ lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣∣ c1− 2δ −
[
(c− ) · 1− (2δ)
N−N0+1
1− 2δ +
N−1∑
k=N−N0+1
(2δ)k · v (2N−k)]∣∣∣∣∣ (3.16)
≤ lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣ c1− 2δ −
[
(c− ) · 1− (2δ)
N−N0+1
1− 2δ + (N0 − 1) · (2δ)
N−N0+1 · v(2)
]∣∣∣∣ (3.17)
≤
∣∣∣∣ 1− 2δ
∣∣∣∣ . (3.18)
Hence, ∀ν > 0 ∃N0 such that
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣∣ c1− 2δ −
N−1∑
k=0
(2δ)k · v (2N−k)∣∣∣∣∣ < ν ∀N ≥ N0. (3.19)
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In other words
lim
N→∞
N−1∑
k=0
(2δ)k · v (2N−k) = 1
1− 2δ · limN→∞ v
(
2N
)
. (3.20)
Next, we derive the second necessary condition (ST.STP ∗)by applying
the ratio test. From now on, we always assume δ > 0.5. This leads to:
V LT (LSTP ) = (2δ − 1) ·
[
lim
N→∞
v
(
2N
)
(2δ)N
+
∞∑
k=1
(
1
2δ
)k
· v (2k)] . (3.21)
Equation (3.21) converges if and only if the series
∞∑
k=1
(
1
2δ
)k ·v (2k) converges.
The ratio test indicates that if
∞∑
k=1
(
1
2δ
)k · v (2k) converges then (necessary
condition):
lim
k→∞
∣∣∣∣∣
(
1
2δ
)k+1 · v (2k+1)(
1
2δ
)k · v (2k)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1. (3.22)
After substituting z for 2k+1 and some rearrangements, we get exactly the
above stated second condition:
lim
z→∞
v (0.5z)
v (z)
≥ 1
2δ
. (3.23)
Since we primarily aim to investigate the conflict with the conditions
of the Allais paradox, we only state the necessary conditions in Proposition
3.1. However, condition (ST.STP ∗)can be easily transformed to a sufficient
condition by replacing the greater or equal sign with a strict greater sign.
The Local-Thinker value (3.4) converges if (sufficient condition)
lim
z→∞
v (0.5z)
v (z)
>
1
2δ
. (3.24)
Corollary 3.1 If δ ≤ 0.5, then Salience Theory predicts an infinite
certainty equivalent for the St. Petersburg lottery independent of the choice
of the value function v.
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Proof of Corollary 3.1: According to Proposition 3.1, δ > 0.5 is a necessary
condition for a finite certainty equivalent for LSTP . Thus, δ ≤ 0.5 is sufficient
for an infinite certainty equivalent independent of the choice of the value
function.
Corollary 1 is a trivial consequence of Proposition 3.1. Nevertheless, we
explicitly formalize a statement to highlight the importance of the condition
δ > 0.5. This condition reveals the surprising fact that bounded value
functions are not sufficient for a finite certainty equivalent for LSTP in the
framework of Salience Theory. Intuitively, for δ ≤ 0.5, the N0(< N) smallest
payoffs are assigned an ever smaller decision weight when the number of
coin flips N increases. Note the difference to Cumulative Prospect Theory
and Expected Utility Theory. In these latter frameworks, a bounded value
function always guarantees a finite willingness to pay for LSTP (see, e.g.,
Rieger & Wang, 2006; Dierkes & Sejdiu, 2019b) because the decision weights
for the N0(< N) smallest payoffs stay constant for varying N .
Interestingly, under Salience Theory, extreme probability distortion
(δ ≤ 0.5) fully overrides the value function’s curvature in the context of the
St. Petersburg paradox. For moderate distortion δ > 0.5, though, the value
function is a crucial determinant. There is a trade-off between probability
distortion (right hand side of (3.24)) and the value function’s curvature
(left hand side of (3.24)). In particular, the value function is important for
δ > 0.5. Consider, for example, Bordalo et al.’s (2012) suggested standard
specification of Salience Theory with linear value function v(x) = x and
a salience parameter δ = 0.7. This specification of Salience Theory is not
able to explain the St. Petersburg paradox because it violates the second
St. Petersburg condition (ST.STP ∗), i.e. limz→∞ v(0.5z)v(z) = 0.5 
1
2δ
for
any δ ∈ (0, 1). An interpretation of this result is that the risk aversion
predetermined by the value function has to be substantial enough to override
the risk proclivity generated by the distortion of probabilities induced by
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the salience mechanism.
Although our focus is primarily on the question of whether Salience
Theory is able to resolve Dierkes & Sejdiu’s (2019b) Allais - St. Petersburg
conflict, we want to briefly discuss the use of alternative value functions
and derive some sufficient conditions for finite willingness to pay for the
St. Petersburg lottery. Thereby, we are, to the best of our knowledge, the
first to examine the St. Petersburg paradox in the framework of Salience
Theory.
Table 3.1 lists the most well-known value functions from the literature.
The value function Linear is a simple linear function, Power corresponds
to Tversky & Kahneman’s (1992) value function, and the functions
Logarithmic, Exponential, and HARA (hyperbolic absolute risk aversion)
are standard utility functions from the literature. All listed value functions
are continuous and monotonically increasing with v(0) = 0 and, hence,
satisfy Assumption 3.1. Additionally, Table 3.1 differentiates between
bounded and unbounded value functions. The last column of Table
3.1 reports the if-and-only-if parameter conditions for a finite certainty
equivalent for the St. Petersburg lottery LSTP given the respective value
function (first column).2 Table 3.1 shows that the Logarithmic, Exponential,
and HARA value functions predict a finite certainty equivalent as long as
δ > 0.5 holds. The frequently used power value function v(x) = xα of
Tversky & Kahneman (1992) explains the St. Petersburg paradox if and
only if δ > 2α−1. Following Bordalo et al. (2012) and assuming δ = 0.7 leads
to the restriction that the risk aversion parameter α has to be strictly lower
than α < log(2δ)
log(2)
≈ 0.4854.
In summary, solutions to the St. Petersburg paradox are similarly
restrictive under Salience Theory as they are under Cumulative Prospect
Theory. Especially the originally proposed parametrization of Salience
2For a detailed derivation of the if-and-only-if conditions, see the appendix.
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Table 3.1: If-and-only-if conditions for the explanation of the
St. Petersburg paradox for various value functions under
Salience Theory.
Type Function v(x)
with v(0) = 0
Parameter
restriction
Bounded
utility
Finite certainty
equivalent for LSTP iff
Linear x – no δ > 1
Power xα α > 0 no δ > 2α−1
Logarithmic log(1 + αx) α > 0 no δ > 0.5
Exponential 1− e−αx α > 0 yes δ > 0.5
HARA 1−αα
[(
x
1−α + β
)α
− βα
]
α < 0, β > 0 yes δ > 0.5
Theory by Bordalo et al. (2012) with linear value function fails to explain
the St. Petersburg paradox. And, surprisingly, bounded value functions are
not a sufficient condition for the solution of the St. Petersburg paradox
in the framework of Salience Theory. The following section shows that
the prediction of Allais’ common ratio effect further tightens parameter
restriction under Salience Theory considerably.
3.3 Allais’ common ratio effect under
Salience Theory
To investigate under which conditions Salience Theory explains Allais’
common ratio effect, we follow Bordalo et al. (2012) and consider a choice
between the two equal-mean lotteries
L1(p) = ($z, 0.5p; 0, 1− 0.5p) and L2(p) = ($0.5z, p; 0, 1− p), (3.25)
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which are determined by the payoff amount z > 0 and the probability p.3
Lab experiments systematically reveal that subjects tend to choose the
safer lottery L2 for high probabilities p and the riskier lottery L1 for
low probabilities p (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). A definition of the
common ratio effect is given below:
Definition 3.1 (Common ratio effect) Given the equal-mean lotteries
L1 and L2 defined in (3.25). The common ratio effect occurs if and only
if the preference L1  L2 holds for any p ∈ (0, p∗) and L1 ≺ L2 for any
p ∈ (p∗, 1] where p∗ ∈ (0, 1) indicates the preference reversal probability that
implies L1 ∼ L2.
Since the lotteries L1 and L2 are uncorrelated, the state space is S =
{(z, 0.5z); (0, 0.5z); (z, 0); (0, 0)} and the salience ranking is
σ(z, 0) > σ(0, 0.5z) > σ(z, 0.5z) > σ(0, 0) ∀z > 0.
This salience ranking follows from the diminishing sensitivity property of
the salience function σ (Bordalo et al., 2012, see p. 1249) and holds for any
z > 0 without any parametric assumptions about σ.
The Local Thinker evaluates both lotteries as follows:
V LT (L1) = 0.5p(1− p)δ
η
v(z) + (1− 0.5p)pδ
2
η
v(0)
+ 0.5p2
δ3
η
v(z) + (1− 0.5p)(1− p)δ
4
η
v(0),
(3.26)
V LT (L2) = 0.5p(1− p)δ
η
v(0) + (1− 0.5p)pδ
2
η
v(0.5z)
+ 0.5p2
δ3
η
v(0.5z) + (1− 0.5p)(1− p)δ
4
η
v(0),
(3.27)
where η is just some normalizing constant such that perceived probabilities
sum up to one. It does not affect choices which are determined by the
3For numerical examples of the lottery pair (3.25) see, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky
(1979) Problem 7 and 8.
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maximum max{V LT (L1), V LT (L2)}. We follow Bordalo et al. (2012) and
assume, without loss of generality, v(0) = 0. Then, the Local Thinker prefers
the riskier lottery L1  L2 iff
V LT (L1) > V
LT (L2) (3.28)
⇔ v(z) ·
[
0.5p(1− p)δ
η
+ 0.5p2
δ3
η
]
> v(0.5z) ·
[
(1− 0.5p)pδ
2
η
+ 0.5p2
δ3
η
]
(3.29)
⇔ 1− p (1− δ
2)
2δ − p(δ − δ2) >
v(0.5z)
v(z)
(3.30)
and L1 ≺ L2 vice versa. Inequality (3.30) shows that a risk-seeking
(risk-averse) choice is predicted only if the ratio of decision weights is
strictly greater (smaller) than the ratio of evaluated payoffs v(0.5z)/v(z).
Interestingly, it turns out that the ratio of decision weights (left-hand side
of Inequality (3.30)) is monotonically decreasing in p:
∂
∂p
1− p (1− δ2)
2δ − p (δ − δ2) = −
1− δ(2δ − 1)
δ (2− p(1− δ))2 < 0 for any δ ∈ (0, 1), (3.31)
which means that the probability-weighting mechanism of Salience Theory
satisfies subproportionality in this setting. This is particularly interesting
because subproportionality is a key concept when modeling the common
ratio effect under Prospect Theory (Prelec, 1998). It ensures that if a
preference change between the lottery pairs (L1, L2) for varying p ∈ (0, 1]
exists, it is a unique one. Hence, it excludes unrealistic predictions of
multiple preference reversals. Moreover, this property enables us to focus
on the corner cases p → 0+ and p = 1 for the prediction of the common
ratio effect. The following proposition states the necessary and sufficient
conditions for Salience Theory to predict the common ratio effect according
to Definition 3.1.
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Proposition 3.2 (Necessary and sufficient condition for CRE)
Given Assumption 3.1 and the equal-mean lotteries L1 and L2 defined in
(3.25), then Salience Theory satisfies Definition 3.1 and thus predicts the
common ratio effect for varying probability p ∈ (0, 1] and for payoff z > 0
if and only if (necessary and sufficient condition):
δ
1 + δ
<
v(0.5z)
v(z)
<
1
2δ
. (ST.CRE)
Proof of Proposition 3.2: According to Definition 3.1 and Inequality (3.30),
we have to prove that the common ratio condition (ST.CRE) implies
that the decision-weight ratio (left-hand side of (3.30)) is greater than the
v-ratio v(0.5z)/v(z) for any p ∈ (0, p∗) and smaller for any p ∈ (p∗, 1].
As already shown in (3.31), the decision-weight ratio in Salience Theory
is monotonically decreasing in p. Therefore, to satisfy Definition 3.1 and
especially to ensure the existence of exactly one preference reversal point
p∗ ∈ (0, 1), it is enough to focus on the two corner cases p→ 0+ and p = 1.
If p tends to zero, then condition (3.30), which implies the preference
L1  L2, simplifies to
lim
p→0+
1− p (1− δ2)
2δ − p(δ − δ2) =
1
2δ
>
v(0.5z)
v(z)
. (3.32)
To accommodate the common ratio effect, Salience Theory also has to
predict a preference for the safer lottery L2  L1 if p tends to one (certainty
effect):
lim
p→1
1− p (1− δ2)
2δ − p(δ − δ2) =
δ
1 + δ
<
v(0.5z)
v(z)
. (3.33)
Now, considering both boundaries together leads to the above stated
condition for the common ratio effect:
δ
1 + δ
<
v(0.5z)
v(z)
<
1
2δ
. (3.34)
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Thus, if and only if (3.34) holds, then Definition 3.1 is satisfied and L1  L2
is predicted for any p ∈ (0, p∗) and L1 ≺ L2 for any p ∈ (p∗, 1] where
p∗ ∈ (0, 1) is the preference reversal probability.
The next corollary is a trivial consequence of Proposition 3.2 but a very
practical one because it highlights that δ < 0.5 satisfies the common ratio
condition (ST.CRE) of Proposition 3.2 for any value function v that has a
v-ratio v(0.5z)
v(z)
≥ 1
3
. Note that v(0.5z)
v(z)
≥ 1
3
includes all concave value functions
and even some convex value functions like, e.g., v(x) = x1.5.
Corollary 3.2 Given Assumption 3.1 and the equal-mean lotteries L1 and
L2 defined in (3.25) with payoff z > 0, the combination of a value function
v with v-ratio v(0.5z)
v(z)
≥ 1
3
for all z > 0 and a probability-distortion parameter
δ < 0.5 is sufficient for the prediction of the common ratio effect according
to Definition 3.1.
Proof of Corollary 3.2: The parameter restriction δ < 0.5 implies δ/(1 +
δ) < 1/3 and 1/(2δ) > 1. The value function’s monotonicity assumption in
Assumption 3.1 ensures that the v-ratio is bounded from above, i.e. v(0.5z)
v(z)
≤
1. Together with the assumption that the v-ratio is greater than or equal
to 1
3
, it follows that the v-ratio is bounded between 1
3
≤ v(0.5z)
v(z)
≤ 1 for any
payoff z > 0 (even for z →∞). Hence,
δ
1 + δ
<
1
3
≤ v(0.5z)
v(z)
≤ 1 < 1
2δ
∀z > 0, (3.35)
and the common ratio condition (ST.CRE) of Proposition 3.2 is satisfied.
Corollary 3.2 shows that Salience Theory with δ < 0.5 explains
the common ratio effect for all commonly employed value functions (see
Table 3.1 for examples) and also for any level of positive risk aversion.
Besides practicability, this result illustrates again the dominant role of
δ. If δ ∈ (0, 0.5), then the probability-weighting mechanism in Salience
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Theory generates such a strong risk proclivity, in the case where the winning
probabilities of both lotteries are scaled down (p → 0+) that any level of
risk aversion generated by the value function is fully compensated for –
independent of payoff z > 0 (even for z → ∞). It turns out that this
feature is particularly useful for the prediction of the common ratio effect
because it prevents the issue that the preference reversal probability p∗
can be moved arbitrarily close to zero just by increasing the payoffs of
the lotteries, i.e. by increasing z. Dierkes & Sejdiu (2019b) show that
Cumulative Prospect Theory with typical (continuous) weighting functions
suffers from this very problem and hence has difficulties to predict the
common ratio effect especially when employing bounded value functions.
Moreover, in Salience Theory, the preference reversal probability p∗ can
be represented as an explicit function of δ and the v-ratio v(0.5z)
v(z)
:
p∗ =
1− 2δ · v(0.5z)
v(z)
1− δ2 − (δ − δ2) · v(0.5z)
v(z)
∈ [0, 1] for δ
1 + δ
≤ v(0.5z)
v(z)
≤ 1
2δ
. (3.36)
Figure 3.1 presents a contour plot of (3.36) and nicely summarizes
the results of this chapter in one figure. The blue contour lines in Figure
3.1 depict the parameter sets
(
v(0.5z)
v(z)
, δ
)
that yield to a preference reversal
probability p∗ ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9, 1}. Note that only the parameter sets
that are located strictly in between the two blue solid lines v(0.5z)
v(z)
|p∗=0 = 12δ
and v(0.5z)
v(z)
|p∗=1 = δ1+δ predict a preference reversal probability p∗ ∈ (0, 1)
and thus satisfy the common ratio condition (ST.CRE) of Proposition 3.2.
The parameter sets I and II including and above the blue solid 0-line and
including and below the blue solid 1-line, respectively, do not explain the
common ratio effect because they predict either only risk-averse behavior
I or only risk-seeking behavior II . For example, in area I which
corresponds to v(0.5)
v(z)
≥ 1
2δ
, the safer lottery L2 is always preferred over the
riskier lottery L1 for all p ∈ (0, 1] which means that no preference change
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Figure 3.1: Contour plot of the preference reversal probability p∗.
Notes: The figure illustrates the combination of v-ratio v(0.5z)/v(z) and δ
that yields to p∗ = {0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9, 1}, respectively. In detail, we depict
the v-ratio in dependence of δ and p∗ according to v(0.5z)
v(z)
=
1−p∗(1−δ2)
2δ−p∗(δ−δ2) .
occurs. Interestingly, I is at the same time the domain which has the best
chances to solve the St. Petersburg paradox. This fact already foreshadows
the conflict between the conditions (ST.STP ∗) and (ST.CRE∗) of both
paradoxes.
Figure 3.1 also visualizes Corollary 3.2 and the importance of the
parameter δ. The gray horizontal line at v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 0.5 separates concave
(upper half) and convex (lower half) value functions. When considering
the top-left part of the figure it becomes clear that the combination of
a concave value function
(
v(0.5z)
v(z)
≥ 0.5
)
and δ < 0.5 is sufficient for the
common ratio effect (ST.CRE) as implied by Corollary 3.2. Furthermore,
the figure illustrates that even when assuming a bounded value function and
considering high payoffs, i.e. limz→∞ v(0.5z)/v(z) = 1, Salience Theory is
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still able to predict a reasonable preference reversal probability 0 < p∗ < 1
as long as δ < 0.5. In such a case, function (3.36) simplifies to
p∗| v(0.5z)
v(z)
≈1 =
1− 2δ
1− δ . (3.37)
Interestingly, the model is able to ensure that the preference reversal
probability p∗ does not fall below some threshold. For example, δ = 1
3
ensures that p∗ ∈ [0.5, 1) for any value function with a v-ratio v(0.5z)
v(z)
∈
(0.25, 1]. To see this note that the preference reversal function (3.36) is
monotonically decreasing in v(0.5z)
v(z)
for any δ ∈ (0, 1).4 Thus, a lower v-ratio,
which corresponds to lower risk aversion, leads to a higher preference
reversal probability p∗ and vice versa. This prediction of Salience Theory
is different from that of Cumulative Prospect Theory. Under Cumulative
Prospect Theory, the preference reversal probability p∗ always converges to
zero if the value function’s risk aversion increases to infinity. The reason
for this is that under Cumulative Prospect Theory, an individual’s risk
attitude is determined by both the value function and probability weighting
function. In contrast, Salience Theory’s probability-weighting mechanism
can dominate the value function in this setting if δ < 0.5 and hence can
easily predict the common ratio effect for any concave value function. Recall,
however, that δ < 0.5 cannot accommodate the St. Petersburg paradox.
4The partial derivative of p∗ with respect to the v-ratio v(0.5z)v(z) is negative for any
v(0.5z)
v(z) ∈ [0, 1] and δ ∈ (0, 1):
∂p∗
∂ v(0.5z)v(z)
= − δ(1− δ) · (2δ + 1)(
1− δ2 − (δ − δ2) · v(0.5z)v(z)
)2 < 0 ∀ δ ∈ (0, 1). (3.38)
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3.4 The Allais - St. Petersburg conflict in
Salience Theory
After revisiting the St. Petersburg paradox and the common ratio version of
the Allais paradox separately, we analyze the conflict between the conditions
of both paradoxes. Furthermore, we distinguish between an unbounded
payoff analysis where payoffs can grow infinitely large (as in the original
example) and a bounded payoff analysis where the maximum payoff is
limited to a certain amount. The latter analysis can be considered as a
robustness check and aims to investigate whether the potential conflict is
driven by the infinite expected payoff of the St. Petersburg lottery and hence
the assumption of infinite resources.
3.4.1 Unbounded payoff analysis
Theorem 3.1 (Main Result) Assume decision makers behave according
to Salience Theory with continuous and strictly increasing value function
v and v(0) = 0. The common ratio lotteries are given by L1(p) =
($z, 0.5p; $0, 1− 0.5p) and L2(p) = ($0.5z, p; $0, 1− p) and we assume the
common ratio effect shows up for all payoffs z > 0, in particular for large
payoffs as argued by Allais (1953). Then, there does not exist any set
of parameters that simultaneously explains both Bernoulli’s St. Petersburg
paradox and Allais’ common ratio effect.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Given Allais’ (1953) observation that the Allais
paradox occurs in particular for large payoffs (he used payoffs in the
millions), the following condition can be considered as a special case of
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the common ratio condition (ST.CRE) of Proposition 3.2:
δ
1 + δ
< lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
<
1
2δ
. (ST.CRE∗)
Then, the conflict with the necessary condition of (ST.STP ∗) for the
St. Petersburg paradox
lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
≥ 1
2δ
is ultimately evident since both conditions are in direct conflict.
Theorem 3.1 shows that Salience Theory cannot resolve Dierkes
& Sejdiu’s (2019b) Allais - St. Petersburg conflict. Put differently, no
parameter set is able to explain Bernoulli’s original St. Petersburg paradox
and Allais’ common ratio effect simultaneously. The conflict becomes clear
for any value function v when the payoffs in the common ratio lotteries
L1 and L2 grow infinitely large (z → ∞). Using infinitely large payoffs is
supported by empirical evidence. For example, in his original work, Allais
(1953) used payoffs in the millions. For such high payoffs v(0.5z)
v(z)
≈ lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
for most value functions.
Before we consider a truncated setting where monetary resources are
limited and hence payoffs are bounded, we briefly discuss the use of the
most popular value function v(x) = xα with α > 0 as suggested by Tversky
& Kahneman (1992).
Corollary 3.3 In Salience Theory, if the value function equals the fre-
quently used power function v(x) = xα with α > 0, then the parameter
sets that explain the common ratio effect and the St. Petersburg paradox,
respectively, are strictly disjunct independent of payoff z.
Proof of Corollary 3.3: Compare again the necessary condition (ST.STP ∗)
for the St. Petersburg paradox and the upper necessary condition (ST.CRE)
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for the common ratio effect. When applying v(x) = xα, then lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
=
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 0.5α ∀z > 0 and
lim
z→∞
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 0.5α ≥ 1
2δ
, (St. Petersburg paradox)
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 0.5α <
1
2δ
(Common ratio effect)
which proves that the parameter sets are strictly disjunct independent of z.
Corollary 3.3 highlights that assuming a power value function, including
the linear function as a special case, produces the Allais - St. Petersburg
conflict independent of the payoff level z in the common ratio lotteries L1
and L2. Hence, it is obvious that Bordalo et al.’s (2012) originally proposed
parametrization with linear value function v(x) = x and δ = 0.7 also
produces the conflict for any value z.
3.4.2 Bounded payoff analysis
In this section, we assume that monetary resources are finite. Then, payoff z
in the common ratio lotteries L1 and L2 and the maximum payoff 2N of the
St. Petersburg gamble L(N)STP have to be below a certain threshold. By doing
this, we test whether the occurrence of the Allais - St. Petersburg conflict
in Salience Theory is only an asymptotic result which is mainly driven by
the consideration of infinitely large payoffs.
To keep things simple, we follow Kahneman & Tversky (1979) and
fix z = 6000 in the common ratio example. Then, the Local Thinker
has the choice between the lotteries L1(p) = ($6000, 0.5p; $0, 1− 0.5p) and
L2(p) = ($3000, p; $0, 1− p) for varying probability p ∈ (0, 1]. Definition 3.1
of the common ratio effect is very general and only requires that a preference
reversal point p∗ ∈ (0, 1) exists but not that it lies in a reasonable
range which can be substantiated by empirical evidence. For example,
89
CHAPTER 3. SALIENCE THEORY AND THE
ALLAIS - ST. PETERSBURG CONFLICT
in Kahneman & Tversky (1979) Problem 7 and 8, subjects exhibit the
preferences L1(0.9) ≺ L2(0.9) and L1(0.002)  L2(0.002) which implies
that the preference reversal probability p∗ is in the range 0.002 < p∗ < 0.9.
Obviously, this range of p∗ is a conservative estimate, nevertheless, it
gives us a first indication in what range an acceptable prediction of the
preference reversal probability has to be. Starmer & Sugden (1989, p. 173)
provide a more accurate estimate of the p∗-range and argue that “most
subjects switch preference in the range 0.6 > p > 0.2”. This more accurate
estimate naturally puts tighter restrictions on Salience Theory. Bordalo
et al. (2012) already report on p. 1269 that δ ∈ (0.22, 1) is a necessary
condition for the prediction of p∗ ∈ (0.002, 0.9) when assuming a linear
value function. Since we already know that a linear value function cannot
explain the St. Petersburg paradox, we are particularly interested in what
restrictions for δ follow if we assume more common concave value functions,
for example, a bounded value function which has the best chances to solve
the St. Petersburg paradox.
Table 3.2 presents parameter sets of δ that predict the preference
reversal probability p∗ in the ranges 0.002 < p∗ < 0.9 and 0.2 < p∗ < 0.6,
respectively, for all value functions v listed in Table 3.1 and a given set
of risk-aversion parameters α. Although we already know that the power
value function v(x) = xα with α > 0 produces the Allais - St. Petersburg
conflict independent of the payoff z, we still include this value function
to illustrate the interplay between δ and α in the common ratio example
when the preference reversal probability p∗ has to lie in a realistic range.
For example, if v(x) = x0.4 then δ has to be in the interval (0.124, 0.659)
to satisfy the minimum requirement 0.002 < p∗ < 0.9. When assuming
a linear value function (α = 1), then the preference reversal probability
p∗ is always strictly greater than 2
3
which explains why no δ ∈ (0, 1) is
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Table 3.2: Allais’ common ratio effect under Salience Theory.
Notes: This table indicates parameter sets of δ that predict the preference
reversal probability p∗ in a certain range for all respective value functions v
listed in Table 3.1 for a given set of risk-aversion parameters α. In detail, we
consider a choice between the lotteries L1(p) = ($6000, 0.5p; $0, 1− 0.5p) and
L2(p) = ($3000, p; $0, 1− p) for varying probability p ∈ (0, 1]. The common ratio
effect occurs if and only if the preference L1  L2 holds for any p ∈ (0, p∗) and
L1 ≺ L2 for any p ∈ (p∗, 1] where p∗ ∈ (0, 1) indicates the preference reversal
probability that implies L1 ∼ L2. The ranges 0.002 < p∗ < 0.9 and 0.2 < p∗ < 0.6
are motivated by the experimental observations in Kahneman & Tversky (1979)
and Starmer & Sugden (1989), respectively.
Function v v-ratio v(0.5z)v(z) α-value
δ-condition for a given range of p∗
0.002 < p∗ < 0.9 0.2 < p∗ < 0.6
Power 0.5α
α = 1 δ ∈ (0.222, 1.000) ∅
α = 0.7 δ ∈ (0.161, 0.812) δ ∈ (0.543, 0.762)
α = 0.4 δ ∈ (0.124, 0.659) δ ∈ (0.399, 0.599)
Logarithmic
log(1 + α3000)
log(1 + α6000)
α = 0.5 δ ∈ (0.100, 0.547) δ ∈ (0.317, 0.489)
α = 1 δ ∈ (0.099, 0.543) δ ∈ (0.314, 0.485)
α = 2 δ ∈ (0.099, 0.539) δ ∈ (0.312, 0.482)
Exponential 1− e
−α3000
1− e−α6000
α = 0.001 δ ∈ (0.096, 0.524) δ ∈ (0.302, 0.468)
α = 0.01 δ ∈ (0.091, 0.500) δ ∈ (0.286, 0.444)
α = 0.1 δ ∈ (0.091, 0.500) δ ∈ (0.286, 0.444)
HARA (β = 1)
(
0.5z
1−α + 1
)α
− 1(
z
1−α + 1
)α
− 1
α = −0.25 δ ∈ (0.094, 0.513) δ ∈ (0.294, 0.457)
α = −0.5 δ ∈ (0.092, 0.503) δ ∈ (0.288, 0.448)
α = −1 δ ∈ (0.091, 0.500) δ ∈ (0.286, 0.445)
able to predict a p∗ ∈ (0.2, 0.6).5 For a graphical illustration see contour
5Given that the value function’s v-ratio is 0.5, then the preference reversal function
(3.36) simplifies to
p∗
(
δ,
v(0.5z)
v(z)
= 0.5
)
=
1− δ
1− δ2 − 0.5 (δ − δ2) . (3.39)
The image of p∗(δ, 0.5) equals the interval
(
2
3 , 1
)
for δ ∈ (0, 1). The lower bound 23 follows
when considering the limit δ → 1:
lim
δ→1
1− δ
1− δ2 − 0.5 (δ − δ2)
l′Hopital
= lim
δ→1
−1
−2δ − 0.5 (1− 2δ) =
−1
−1.5 =
2
3
. (3.40)
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lines p∗ = {0.2, 0.6} in Figure 3.1. Both contour lines are monotonically
decreasing and consistently greater than 0.5 (horizontal gray line) for any
δ ∈ (0, 1). This shows that 0.2 < p∗ < 0.6 is not possible with a linear value
function.
Considering now the δ-conditions for the more interesting value
functions Logarithmic, Exponential, and HARA, shows surprisingly narrow
ranges for δ. For the conservative range 0.002 < p∗ < 0.9, the upper
bounds of the δ-conditions are just slightly higher than 0.5 for all listed
values of α. If we require the more accurate prediction 0.2 < p∗ < 0.6,
then the upper bounds of δ are strictly lower than 0.5 for all listed
specifications. Even for moderate values of z and a wide range of the
preference reversal probability p∗, δ is not allowed to be greater than 0.5.
The Allais - St. Petersburg conflict is then predetermined because δ > 0.5
is one of the necessary conditions for the solution of the St. Petersburg
paradox. Note that choosing an unrealistically low risk-aversion parameter α
does not solve the problem, because then the certainty equivalent of the
St. Petersburg gamble will grow tremendously. For example, assuming a
logarithmic value function v(x) = log(1 + αx) with α = 0.5 and δ = 0.54
satisfies the minimum requirement 0.002 < p∗ < 0.9 but predicts a
willingness to pay of $12,884.57 for St. Petersburg lottery LSTP which is
an unrealistic prediction of typical human behavior. People are usually
unwilling to pay more than $8 to play the lottery (see, e.g., Hayden & Platt,
2009; Cox et al., 2011). Thus, decreasing the value function’s risk aversion
does not help. At best, it provides only a theoretical corner solution without
much practical benefits. Therefore, the conflict between the conditions of a
finite willingness to pay for the St. Petersburg lottery and Allais’ common
ratio effect is not caused by an unrealistic payoff level z in the common
ratio lotteries or any other parameter. In fact, the results show that a
realistic prediction of the common ratio effect alone suggests δ < 0.5 for all
92
3.4. THE ALLAIS - ST. PETERSBURG CONFLICT IN SALIENCE THEORY
value functions except the function Power. The power function, however, is
immediately ruled out when we want to predict the St. Petersburg paradox
in addition to the common ratio effect (see Corollary 3.3).
Next, we test whether the Allais - St. Petersburg conflict is driven by
the infinite expected payoff of the St. Petersburg lottery. Technically, we
consider a truncated St. Petersburg lottery where the maximum payoff of
the lottery is 2N . Recall that L(N)STP yields a payoff $2
k with probability 0.5k
for k = 1, . . . , N − 1 and a payoff of $2N with probability 0.5N−1. The
expected value of the lottery is N + 1 and corresponds to N − 1 possible
rounds of coin flipping. For example, for N = 40, the expected payoff equals
$41 and the maximum payoff is $240 which equals roughly 1 trillion dollars.
In Figure 3.2, we depict the willingness to pay CE
(
L
(N)
STP
)
=
v−1
(
V LT
(
L
(N)
STP
))
as a function of N for the truncated St. Petersburg
gamble, where N = 2, . . . , 40 determines the maximum payoff $2N , for
various parametrizations of Salience Theory. We focus on the value functions
Logarithmic v(x) = log(1 + x) and Exponential v(x) = 1 − e−x and two
exemplary values of δ = {0.4, 0.7}. Both value functions are chosen because
they are simple and, more importantly, they resolve the St. Petersburg
paradox in Expected Utility Theory and Cumulative Prospect Theory
(Bernoulli, 1738, 1954; Menger, 1934; Dierkes & Sejdiu, 2019b). The choice
of δ = 0.7 follows the suggestion of Bordalo et al. (2012) and δ = 0.4 is
interesting because it violates the St. Petersburg condition δ > 0.5 without
being too far away from 0.5.
Figure 3.2 shows that the logarithmic value function v(x) = log(1 + x)
predicts acceptable certainty equivalents only for δ = 0.7 (solid line) but
not for δ = 0.4 (dashed line). The combination with δ = 0.4 (dashed line)
performs poorly because, for all depicted truncation levels N , it predicts
certainty equivalents higher than the expected value (risk-seeking behavior).
Even worse, the certainty equivalent increases exponentially in N . This
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Figure 3.2: Certainty equivalents for the truncated
St. Petersburg lottery under Salience Theory.
Notes: This figure depicts the willingness to pay CE
(
L
(N)
STP
)
=
v−1
(
V LT
(
L
(N)
STP
))
for the truncated St. Petersburg lottery under Salience
Theory where N = 2, . . . , 40 determines the maximum payoff $2N . The truncated
gamble promises a payoff of $2k with probability 0.5k for k = 1, . . . , N − 1 and
a payoff of $2N with probability 0.5N−1. The gray line represents the expected
value of the lottery. Individual’s preferences are given by the value functions
Logarithmic (v(x) = log(1 + x)) and Exponential (v(x) = 1 − e−x) and the
salience mechanism of Bordalo et al. (2012) with δ = {0.4, 0.7}, respectively.
result is no surprise because δ > 0.5 is one of the necessary conditions
for the solution of the St. Petersburg paradox. With δ = 0.7, however,
the logarithmic value function predicts certainty equivalents higher than
the expected value (risk-seeking behavior) for low truncation levels N =
2, . . . , 8. This is relevant because experimental studies show that subjects
also behave risk averse in the truncated St. Petersburg gamble (e.g. Hayden
& Platt, 2009).
Consider now the specifications with the exponential value function
v(x) = 1 − e−x. Figure 3.2 reveals that the exponential value function
predicts reasonable certainty equivalents even for δ = 0.4. More precisely,
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the certainty equivalents are lower than the expected value of the lottery
(positive risk premium) throughout all depicted truncation levels, thereby
correctly indicating risk-averse behavior for all 2 ≤ N ≤ 40. Moreover, this
combination implies for N = 40 (≈maximum payoff of 1 trillion dollars) a
certainty equivalent of only $12.33 which is a good prediction. Note that
the combination of v(x) = 1 − e−x and δ = 0.4 also yields a preference
reversal probability of p∗ ≈ 1
3
for Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) common
ratio lotteries with payoff z = 6000. Such a prediction of p∗ furthermore
satisfies Starmer & Sugden’s (1989) tighter suggestion 0.2 < p∗ < 0.6.
Finally, the predicted certainty equivalent for the St. Petersburg lottery
strictly decreases when the constant absolute risk aversion parameter α
increases while the preference reversal probability p∗ for the common ratio
lotteries remains always higher than 1
3
as long as δ = 0.4. For example,
choosing v(x) = 1 − e−2x predicts a certainty equivalent of $7.24 for the
St. Petersburg lottery with N = 40 and preference reversal probability
p∗ ≈ 1
3
for the common ratio lotteries.
The examples of this section demonstrate that combinations of v
and δ exist that are able to predict a reasonable willingness to pay for
truncated St. Petersburg lotteries and accommodate the empirical evidence
on Allais’ common ratio effect simultaneously. This result is by no means
trivial and shows that Salience Theory has an edge over other prominent
decision theories. For example, Dierkes & Sejdiu (2019b) show that, with
typical (continuous) parametrizations of Cumulative Prospect Theory, the
Allais - St. Petersburg conflict emerges for unbounded as well as bounded
payoff lotteries.
3.5 Conclusion
Bordalo et al.’s (2012) Salience Theory is a new promising context-
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dependent descriptive theory of choice under risk. Extensive tests of this
theory are, however, still work in progress. Our paper contributes to this
literature by examining Salience Theory with Dierkes & Sejdiu’s (2019b)
Allais - St. Petersburg test. We find that Salience Theory can resolve the
Allais - St. Petersburg conflict but only under the assumptions of finite
resources and a value function which generates substantial risk aversion
(e.g. bounded value functions). A simple parametrization of Salience Theory
that performs sufficiently well consists of the exponential value function
v(x) = 1 − e−x, a probability-distortion parameter value δ ≈ 0.4, and any
salience function for ranking states with the properties ordering and dimin-
ishing sensitivity, as proposed by Bordalo et al. (2012). This parametrization
simultaneously predicts a reasonable willingness to pay for the truncated
St. Petersburg lottery and an empirically substantiated preference reversal
probability for Allais’ common ratio lotteries with equal-mean lotteries.
The Allais - St. Petersburg conflict emerges only asymptotically for this
specification, i.e. when considering the original St. Petersburg lottery with
infinite expected payoff. Although theoretically imperfect, this specification
works sufficiently well in a realistic, resource-constrained environment.
This study also reveals new implications of Salience Theory and
highlights differences to related decision theories such as Expected Utility
Theory and Cumulative Prospect Theory. One important peculiarity of
Salience Theory is that the probability-weighting mechanism can have a
significantly stronger impact on the decision maker’s choice than the utility
concept (i.e. the shape of the value function). In particular, we show that a
probability-distortion parameter δ ≤ 0.5 can fully override the impact of a
value function’s curvature in this setting. Under Salience theory, there can
be both a trade-off between probability distortion and value function as well
as the value function’s impact being muted.
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B Appendix
In the following, we derive the if-and-only-if conditions for a finite
certainty equivalent for the St. Petersburg lottery LSTP listed in Table 3.1.
Throughout this section, we follow Proposition 3.1 and assume the necessary
condition δ > 0.5. Then, Equation (3.4) simplifies to
V LT (LSTP ) = (2δ − 1)
[
lim
N→∞
v
(
2N
)
(2δ)N
+
∞∑
k=1
(
1
2δ
)k
· v (2k)] . (B.1)
We skip the case of the linear value function v(x) = x and start with the
power value function v(x) = xα since it includes linear utility as a special
case (α = 1).
1. Power value function v(x) = xα, α > 0:
V LT (LSTP ) = (2δ − 1)
[
lim
N→∞
(
2N
)α
(2δ)N
+
∞∑
k=1
(
1
2δ
)k
· (2k)α] (B.2)
= (2δ − 1)
[
lim
N→∞
(
1
δ21−α
)N
+
∞∑
k=1
(
1
δ21−α
)k]
(B.3)
=
∞ if δ2
1−α ≤ 1
2δ−1
δ21−α−1 if δ2
1−α > 1
. (B.4)
Series (B.2) converges if and only if δ21−α > 1 because
∞∑
k=1
(
1
δ21−α
)k is a
geometric series. For α = 1, which corresponds to a linear value function
v(x) = x, δ > 1 is then the iff-condition for a finite certainty equivalent for
LSTP .
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2. Logarithmic value function v(x) = log(1 + αx), α > 0:
V LT (LSTP ) = (2δ − 1)
[
lim
N→∞
log
(
1 + α2N
)
(2δ)N
+
∞∑
k=1
(
1
2δ
)k
· log (1 + α2k)]
(B.5)
= (2δ − 1) ·
∞∑
k=1
(
1
2δ
)k
· log (1 + α2k) <∞ ∀α > 0. (B.6)
Our general assumption δ > 0.5 and the ratio test imply that (B.5)
converges if and only if δ > 0.5 for any α > 0:
lim
k→∞
∣∣∣∣∣
(
1
2δ
)k+1 · log (1 + α2k+1)(
1
2δ
)k · log (1 + α2k)
∣∣∣∣∣ = 12δ · limk→∞ log
(
1 + α2k+1
)
log (1 + α2k)
=
1
2δ
= r < 1.
(B.7)
3. Exponential value function v(x) = 1− e−αx, α > 0:
V LT (LSTP ) = (2δ − 1)
[
lim
N→∞
1− e−α2N
(2δ)N
+
∞∑
k=1
(
1
2δ
)k
·
(
1− e−α2k
)]
(B.8)
= (2δ − 1) ·
∞∑
k=1
(
1
2δ
)k
·
(
1− e−α2k
)
(B.9)
< (2δ − 1) ·
∞∑
k=1
(
1
2δ
)k
= 1 ∀α > 0. (B.10)
The certainty equivalent v−1
(
V LT (LSTP )
)
is finite if and only if δ > 0.5
for any given α > 0 since V LT (LSTP ) < v(∞) = 1 iff δ > 0.5.
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4. HARA value function v(x) = 1−α
α
[(
x
1−α + β
)α − βα], α < 0, β > 0:
V LT (LSTP ) = (2δ − 1) ·
 lim
N→∞
1−α
α
[(
2N
1−α + β
)α
− βα
]
(2δ)N
+
∞∑
k=1
(
1
2δ
)k
· 1− α
α
[(
2k
1− α + β
)α
− βα
]] (B.11)
=
(α− 1)(2δ − 1)
α
·
∞∑
k=1
(
1
2δ
)k
·
[
βα −
(
2k
1− α + β
)α]
(B.12)
<
(α− 1)(2δ − 1)
α
·
∞∑
k=1
(
1
2δ
)k
· βα (B.13)
=
α− 1
α
βα = v(∞) ∀α < 0, β > 0. (B.14)
The certainty equivalent v−1
(
V LT (LSTP )
)
is finite if and only if δ > 0.5
for any given α < 0 and β > 0 because V LT (LSTP ) < v(∞) = α−1α βα iff
δ > 0.5.
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Chapter 4
Indistinguishability of Small
Probabilities,
Subproportionality, and the
Common Ratio Effect
This chapter is based on the Article “Indistinguishability of small
probabilities, subproportionality, and the common ratio effect” authored
by Maik Dierkes and Vulnet Sejdiu, Journal of Mathematical Psychology,
93, 2019.
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2019.102283
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Chapter 5
Probability Distortion, Asset
Prices and Economic Growth
This chapter is based on the Article “Probability distortion, asset prices
and economic growth” authored by Maik Dierkes, Stephan Germer, and
Vulnet Sejdiu, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 84, 2020.
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2019.101476
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